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THE WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIVERSITY REVIEW

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Autumn, 1958

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IS AMERICA A CIVILIZATION?

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YES: MAX LERNER
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
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By DAVID RIESMAN



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Introduction

IS AMERICA A CIVILIZATION?

The discovery of a New World by Old World explorers was, in the full sense of the word, epical. Man beheld something commensurate to his capacity for wonder. It was breath-taking.

Not many breaths later the debate over the role and destiny of America began. For centuries it has continued to engage, enrage, excite, and inspire men of good, medium, and bad will. It could, and has, set off a Revolution and a Civil War. The libraries of the world bulge with visitors' accounts of our not very United States. Goethe looked longingly across the Atlantic and wrote:

America, thou farest better
Than our own continent, the old one . . .
Thou are not shaken in this hour of life
By useless memories and futile strife.

Sigmund Freud had quite a different opinion. "I regret that Columbus ever discovered America," he wrote. "It is a bad experiment conducted by providence. At least I think it must have been providence. I would hate to be held responsible for it!"

The range of opinion in this *Shenandoah* may not be as wide as that of Goethe and of Freud: but it is considerable. The theme came from conversations with Professor Arnold Toynbee during his visiting lecturship at Washington and Lee in the spring term of 1958. Since Max Lerner's thousand-page opus, *America as a Civilization*, had just appeared, he was the obvious person to comment on Dr. Toynbee's view. The two essays were provocative enough to draw further observations from distinguished scholars and writers in the area of American thought; by printing

a dozen of these, we have attempted to turn what started out as a debate into a symposium.

Willard Thorp, president of the American Studies Association, teaches at Princeton; David M. Potter at Yale; Henry Nash Smith at the University of California, Berkeley; William Jordy at Brown; Robert Walker at the University of Wyoming; Louis Rubin, Jr., at Hollins; and John Hague at Stetson. Henry Beston, author of *American Memory* and *The Outermost House*, lives on his farm in Maine.

Marcus Cunliffe, who oversees the program in American Studies at the University of Manchester, has just returned to England after a year at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford, California. Hans Galinsky was in America this fall, doing special work on colonial American literature, but has returned now to the Johannes Gutenberg-Universität in Mainz, where he directs the Amerika Institut. John McCormick, a former *Shenandoah* contributor, heads the Amerika Institut at the Freie Universität Berlin. George Shepperson is a professor at the University of Edinburgh, but will lecture in the United States next year. Yves Couderc teaches at the Collège Cévenol at Le Chambon-sur-Lignon, France.

Several of these gentlemen noted the gulf between individual Americans and the American policy which represents them. Hence we felt especially fortunate to procure from David Riesman (formerly of the University of Chicago, but now at Harvard) an article on "Private People and Public Policy."

MARSHALL FISHWICK



Arnold Toynbee

America seems to me to be an extension of an old civilization flowering in a new way and under new conditions. There have been other frontiers, such as the eastern frontier of the Germans and the Siberian frontier of the Russians, which have had the same attitude and inspiration as America. This was not a unique undertaking. And it was not made for America alone, but for the whole western world.

Neither the men of the colonial age nor their successors who made the Revolution intended to make a cultural break with the homeland. They intended to remain members of their civilized world, the European republic of letters; they were still western Europeans overseas. Western society in the old world and western society in the new world are branches of the same tree.

In *America as a Civilization* Max Lerner writes, I understand, of "The Slaying of the European Father," and the American attack on authority images. But is not this a human, not a national, tendency? I should say that two tendencies seem to develop simultaneously. Immigrants wish to be new; but they do not wish to lose contact with their past. Examples can be found by looking wherever European settlers have gone. It is as true for Canada or Brazil or New Zealand as it is for the United States.

Mr. Lerner, you tell me, also stresses the existence of what he calls "inner civilization styles." His point is well taken, as is his suggestion that the hallmark of western man's "style" is a strong belief in the sacredness of the individual. This was well stated by Locke in England and Jefferson in America. Today, on both sides of the Atlantic, super organizations within our society constitute a growing threat to the sacred individual. The authors of the American Constitution and the men who wrote Britain's 1832 Reform Bill did not foresee this danger. They thought of the citizen as being economically, politically, and psychologically an independent man. It was unthinkable for them that he might become a servant or pawn of a great organization which would dictate his life and philosophy to him. I fear that our contempo-

rary institutions may have deprived western man of some of his innate dignity. The French are revolting against this, among other things. To this extent they are fighting the battle for western civilization's "style." They are conscious of the fact that they have made their stand for the individual.

Most Americans would hasten to say that they would do just the same; they too are individualists. To me, and I think to many west Europeans, Americans seem in some things to be conformists, following patterns more readily than the French or the Austrians would do.

This can be seen in trivial outward matters like dress, in which Americans are surely more conformist than Europeans; and it can be seen in fashions of thought also. On occasions Americans have been quite intolerant. One startling example occurred during and after the Revolutionary War, when many of those Americans who took the British side had to leave the country. In the eighteenth century this was unusual. Such intolerance of others' political views had not prevailed in Europe since the Wars of Religion. America re-started that in the modern world.

One could perhaps see the same spirit at work in the treatment meted out to the American Indian, or in the violent feeling generated by the Civil War. It was the greatest and grimmest war of the nineteenth century.

America has been the land of hope and opportunity for all Europeans of every nation, class, and occupation; but her role has changed in European eyes. Europeans still look towards her, but today they see her in a different role, as a citadel of the western world. American opportunities for newcomers began to close in after the first World War. The immigration restriction acts of 1921 and 1924 were historic events in the inner history of the whole western world. They have had something to do with our subsequent catastrophe.

America fired the shot heard round the world. The echo of that shot is still being heard in the Arab countries and all over Asia and Africa; but America doesn't seem to like the sound of it now. How ironical—arch-revolutionary America assuming the role of the arch-conservative power in the contemporary world. This is

something that the Founding Fathers (even though they were mostly aristocrats) would never have dreamt of, and would, I believe, have disliked. In many eyes America now represents the very attitudes against which she herself revolted. The slayer of the father is not showing much patience with liberty-loving children. Here, in Asian and African eyes today, is the power that maintains authority whether it represents the popular will or not. Here is a conservative bastion. This alarms me because in the past, conservative bastions have seldom held out permanently.

You quote Scott Fitzgerald as saying that France is a land, England a people, and America a willingness of the heart. Anyone who meets Americans individually, especially in their own country, is sure to feel it. But the individual is not always mirrored in the nation. The picture formed by meeting citizens is not always the one formed by following the course of international politics.

Obviously many Americans, like other people in other times and places, are concerned with worldly goods. This isn't bad as long as material objects are kept in their place. But material things are very pushing in American life; the scramble for them sometimes becomes frantic. Here is another American trait which is actually an exaggeration of the general European trait in modern times. When the world thinks of the west, it thinks of America as *the* typical western country, and of Britain, France, or Germany as approximations. The child has taken on the parent image.

Using Mr. Lerner's point about civilization styles, I would say that America is a sub-style rather than a civilization. One has to classify, but he must never take the classifications too seriously. America has no myths or symbols which basically distinguish her from the western culture out of which she sprang. Her symbols and ideas come out of our common past. Her chief myth—that of leaving the city of destruction to move through the wilderness to the promised land—goes back to the ancient Hebrews. Words attributed to Moses are quoted on the Liberty Bell.

This is not to say that America is merely a pale copy of Europe—not at all. For example, the role of women in American society is striking to a western European. We are struck by American

women's great power and also by their longevity. In America men wear themselves out. The women are preserved.

There is certainly an American flavor in the arts and there are appreciable regional distinctions within the sub-culture. This was more true when I first visited the U.S.A. in 1925 than it is now. The inward-turned attitude of the midwest, so prominent in the first World War, seems to me to be vanishing. The Southern attitude, turned not merely inward but backward—and the self-conscious cultivation of the Lost Cause—is surely diminishing, despite current conflicts over integration. That integration can be proposed at all shows how far the South has come. There is still Texas; but some of the best Texas jokes are now at the expense of the Texans' own chauvinism. On the whole, the tendency has, I should say, been strongly towards national unification.

Visitors feel that America displays more self-confidence than one finds in west European countries today. Having gone nationalistic earlier, the older countries have perhaps come nearer to working through nationalism. Unfortunately, it is still a world disease, and Europe too is still much afflicted by it.

Yet if an American and a west European found themselves together in India, China, or Japan, they would soon realize their strong cultural kinship with each other, and become almost unconscious of their differences within western civilization. Sub-styles vanish in the presence of a different civilization.

America is, of course, still very much the land of change, particularly in technology. Some writers imply that this is the basis of the permanent revolution which goes on in the U.S.A. But a nation can be very inventive in technology, and still very conservative in human affairs. Technology has always been the common possession of the human race. Few people are capable of major inventions; yet once invented, machines are easily adopted and improved. If America is to regain her revolutionary zeal, it must be in spiritual fields. Technology won't do the trick. The question is: how will the technology in which America has pioneered be used at home and in the rest of the world?

I believe we are moving into a new phase, and that "mission-

ary warfare" will replace military warfare.¹ Obviously the armament race will not stop overnight; but we are moving quickly into this new field of competition. In missionary warfare, what are the winning tactics?

First, deeds and not words. Conviction grows out of what people do, not what they say. Secondly, to put one's own house in order, rather than to denounce the opposition for having an untidy house. The key to success is to reread the parable of the mote and the beam; to take it to heart, and act on it. In missionary warfare, self-righteousness is an absolute boomerang.

I have spoken of spiritual fields. "Spiritual" and "religious" are not always synonymous. Church membership in America, compared with Protestant European countries, is remarkably high. At the same time, it is the social side of church activities here that looms largest in a European observer's view. It is very difficult to ascertain just what America's "return to religion" actually means.

Americans nowadays try to be extroverts in their personal relations with each other, but act collectively in an introverted way when they are abroad. For example, members of American missions in a foreign country, though sent there to make contact with the people of that country, tend to live in a closed American circle. Might not the introverted attitude be given greater scope at home and the extroverted attitude abroad?

The Statute of Liberty, presented to the United States by France, has on its base these lines by Emma Lazarus:

"Give me your tired, your poor
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, the tempest-tost, to me.
I lift my lamp beside the golden door."

Roles change with the times; America's job now would seem to be to go out into the world, rather than to receive new immi-

¹This point is further elaborated in Dr. Toynbee's essay on "The European Point of View on American Diplomacy," which appeared in the spring, 1958 issue of *Shenandoah*.

grants; not so much to take as to give. The fate of our common western civilization depends on her. If America can recapture her ancestral revolutionary spirit, perhaps she can still convert the world to the American hope for the future of mankind. But if this hope is to be inspiring and captivating, it must be the spiritual hope that it was in the days of the Founding Fathers.

Max Lerner

With a good many of Mr. Toynbee's observations it would be difficult to quarrel, especially his all-too-true comment on how a once revolutionary America has become a "bastion of conservatism," and his gloomy but well-grounded guess that conservative bastions do not "hold out permanently." I might note that in my *America as a Civilization* a section of the second and the whole of the last chapter labor the same point of the rigidities of American policy in the last decade.

From here on, I fear, I depart from Mr. Toynbee. To some extent it is because I feel that his observations on American "conformity" and "materialism" are too close to the surface and too conformist to draw much blood. But this is of no great importance, mainly because it does not reach to the central issue between us. There are at least three major questions to which Mr. Toynbee's remarks seem to be addressed: first, does America form a characteristic civilization pattern of its own? second, how good and virtuous is it? third, what are some of the traits of the American national character within this frame? The second and third issues do not seem particularly interesting to me at this moment. It is the first which is of importance. I have written elsewhere a more extended analysis (in a debate with Mr. Toynbee to appear in the December, 1958 issue of *Western World*) of this problem, but I am happy to add some words here on it. What Mr. Toynbee says when he touches on it in the present case is attractively persuasive, as his writing always is, but for me not decisive.

He has put his argument in several different ways, and while

they overlap, each of them is worth some serious thought and answer.

American civilization, he says, does not have its own inner style but is a sub-style of the West—that is to say, of Europe. It would be foolish to deny how much America owes to Europe in its inception and throughout its history. No civilization is born in isolation, and unlike the rhinoceros a civilization does not wander alone. It has parentage (in the American case a multiple parentage), and it has continuing contacts with other civilizations. I have spoken in my book of the “American-Europe nexus,” but I have also suggested that the process of breaking away began almost as soon as the nexus itself was formed. The whole interlaced history of America and Europe is an infinitely tangled one. If my book had been on the *history* of American civilization, I should have tried to trace the pattern of breakaway, starting from the time when Americans revolted but in their revolt demanded the “rights of Englishmen,” and ending with the present moment when the English are in turn revolting from America and asking for equal rights in a world constitutional structure in which their protective umbrella is American power. The American slogan at the beginning was “no taxation without representation,” and the English slogan now (as Mr. Toynbee has himself elsewhere remarked) is “no annihilation without representation.” In between these two points there took place the emergence not just of an American nation but of an American civilization.

Mr. Toynbee also suggests that when the world thinks of the West, it thinks of America as a typical Western country. In other words, not only does America have a civilization sub-style, but it is one quite typical of the rest of the West, and in no substantial ways unique. Again there is enough of a core of truth here to make it persuasive. I have spoken in my book of the American as the “archetypal man of the West.” But there is no contradiction between saying this and saying also that America has hewed out a civilization path of its own. What has happened is that we have borrowed many cultural traits and institutions from Europe, but developed them with such intensity as to make them universal. When other peoples, in Asia or Africa, in the Middle East or Latin

America, think of the West, they think first of America, even before they think of Europe. Partly this is due to the fact that in our power struggle with communism we have made the cause of Western man our own, and have therefore become symbolic of the whole Western "camp." If this means anything, it doesn't mean that we have taken over the European traits, but that to a large extent they are today adopting ours. The interesting fact about the America-Europe nexus is that it is a two-way process. Once it meant the Europeanization of America. Today the arc has swung the other way, and what the world is witnessing is the Americanization of Europe. If European civilization had not existed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, America could not have become Europeanized. Similarly if an American civilization—distinct and characteristic—did not exist in the mid-twentieth century, it would be a silly thing to talk about the Americanization of Europe.

I do not want to press this point too hard, yet I am tempted to use against Mr. Toynbee some ammunition from his own vast work, *A Study of History*. At one point, in speaking of Western history (Volume 1, page 41), he traces it back to the Greco-Roman civilization but adds that the Greco-Roman roots in Western history "are not those which would appear to be of capital importance" to a historian of the classical world. I might suggest that America bears something of the same relation to Europe that European civilization in its own day bore to the classical world.

Again, in talking of Russia, he points out that there was a union of Western elements with the indigenous elements of Orthodox Christianity. Surely the Russia of today cannot be understood simply as part of Orthodox Christendom (which is one of Toynbee's major categories) any more than it can be understood as part of the Western civilization from which Peter the Great and Lenin borrowed so much. Whatever its borrowings, Communist Russia today is a characteristic civilization of its own, even though no one in Russia would dare to write a book called *Russia as a Civilization*. Equally America, for all its borrowings and affiliations, can lay claim to the same status. It is interesting that Mr. Toynbee by

his logic, would deny uniqueness to both the great civilization styles which are struggling for world mastery today.

I leave to the end Mr. Toynbee's suggestion that America has no distinguishing myths and symbols of its own. It would be futile for me to argue this point within the present space. It took me a thousand pages to analyze the mind and imagination, as well as the institutions, of America today. At every point—in its architecture, its industrial design, its courtship customs, its family patterns, its sexual behavior, its political institutions, its economy—the Americans have developed not only a recognizable pattern of their own but also recognizable symbols. If we have thus far not developed any great myths to contribute to the world's stock of myths, it may be because we have been too busy building a structure of power and assembling people from every part of the world into a relatively cohesive whole. If there are few American myths that Mr. Toynbee would recognize, he might agree that the whole American experience has had in it the quality of a myth.

It may be that the difference between us comes down to the fact that Mr. Toynbee starts as a European while I start as an American. Each of us uses his own context for his angle of vision. This may explain also why I do not share the view that Mr. Toynbee has developed throughout his great work, that modern life is a Fall from Grace. All the world's civilizations may well be doomed, but if they are it is because of forces that are not restricted to American civilization or to our national character.

Hans K. Galinsky

The question *Shenandoah* asks—"Is America a Civilization?"—overlaps with the one dealt with at the 1956 annual meeting of the German Association for American Studies. Our approach was threefold: linguistic, literary, and socio-economic. It seemed to me that the enormity of the subject was completely out of proportion to the methods used to tackle it.

Specifically, our question had been formulated this way: "Can

American and English civilizations and literatures be looked upon as presenting a unity?" To translate properly the ambiguity implied in the German ("Kann man die amerikanische und englische Kultur und Literatur als Einheit betrachten?") I should perhaps have said, "Can the civilization and literature of the United States and Great Britain be looked upon as a unity?"

Although in 1956 I had to sift the linguistic data and report to the Association, I felt and frankly stated that conclusions from the "unity in diversity" principle, seemingly valid for a scientific description of British-American language relations, became extremely doubtful when applied to cultural relations. The existence of a world-wide English language area, with its various national divisions, and their intra-national subdivisions, partly regional, and partly social, need by no means be identical with the existence of a world-wide "Anglo-Saxon" civilization, divided and subdivided accordingly. I for one do not master all of the criteria by which to define the existence of a "civilization."

Max Lerner's *America as a Civilization* has been on my bookshelf for around four months. I am not equipped adequately enough to do justice to an opus of its calibre. My basic mistrust is in "totality" and "nation" as tools by which he seems to me to arrive at the concept of civilization as such, and "American civilization" in particular. The "totality" he, along with so many psychologists, anthropologists and others, is talking about, seems to me a *relative* totality only. As a linguist and literary historian I am accustomed to the "loose ends," seemingly primitive survivals, which do not fit into systematic totality; and as a European, I am aware of too many preceding attempts at establishing a "civilization" for each of the larger European "nations." Having lived among, and not simply "toured," British people for more than three years, and among Americans for almost a year, "civilization" more than ever means to me a relative totality of spiritual ends and institutional means, a totality transcending national boundaries. I wish I could live among Chinese or African or Polynesian people long enough to test the relativity and the more-than-national of my civilization concept, which, I fully admit, is limited to my personal experiences.

The same scepticism I feel over against totality as a criterion of civilization does not leave me in face of another formula often met with nowadays. "They (the civilizations of Greece and Rome, of China and Britain, of the Aztec-Mayan, of India, of Renaissance Italy, of Spain and France, of Russia and America) had a way of life and a world view that have become deeply part of human experience." (Lerner, p. 67). If "having a way of life" and the historical impact of this "way of life" are used as criteria for civilizations, and if the metaphor of "way of life" is used correctly, civilizations must be characterized by goals this "way of life" is leading to.

As far as Britain, Renaissance Italy, Spain, France, Russia, America are concerned, there have been and still are many people whose "way of life" is Christian. How can people sharing this basic common feature be parts of totalities such as "British civilization," "Italian civilization," "Spanish civilization" etc., each being said by Lerner to have a "way of life" of its own? In other words, the relation of Christianity, and for this matter, of other world religions as well, to the concept of civilization as handled by Lerner would seem to require further thought.

Willard Thorp

Who asked this question and why are we debating it? Who, this late, are the doubters? If America is not a civilization, why are so many scholars engaged in studying something called American Civilization? What folly for the American Studies Association and the Louisiana State University Press to be issuing this fall *American Studies in the United States: A Survey of College Programs*! What a waste of time for Professor Skard and his many collaborators to have edited a two-volume work, running to over 700 pages and bearing the title *American Studies in Europe: Their History and Present Organization*! Not all the European professors who teach American subjects (the list extends to thirty-six pages, double-column, in Professor Skard's second volume) profess American civilization, but Kögl and Lunzer in Vienna do, so do Simon

at the Sorbonne, Pellizzi at Florence, Behrendt at Berne, *et al.* If this mystery that is expounded at scores of colleges and universities here and abroad is an illusion, then the future of this illusion would seem to be immense.

I would guess that several of my colleagues engaged here in "this great argument" will begin by attempting a definition of civilization. I am going to dodge this question in order to use my space for a consideration of two or three aspects of our national culture (we do have *that*, don't we?) which may be factors in the equation for "a civilization"?

First, I should like to consider the density of the American past. Some of us, I believe, are still under the spell of certain nineteenth-century writers—Hawthorne and Henry James, for instance—who deplored the hypothetical thinness of American culture. In his biography of Hawthorne, James drew up a list of "the absent things in American life," the effect of which "upon an English or French imagination, would probably, as a general thing, be appalling." Here is James's list of "items of high civilization," the lack of which in this country contributed to "the negative side of the spectacle on which Hawthorne looked out."

No State, in the European sense of the word, and indeed barely a specific national name. No sovereign, no court, no personal loyalty, no aristocracy, no church, no clergy, no army, no diplomatic service, no country gentlemen, no palaces, no castles, nor manors, nor old country-houses, nor parsonages, nor thatched cottages, nor ivied-ruins; or no cathedrals, nor abbeys, nor little Norman churches; no great Universities nor public schools—no Oxford, nor Eton, nor Harrow; no literature, no novels, no museums, no pictures, no political society, no sporting class—no Epsom nor Ascot!

James's lamentations sounds silly today (he was not altogether solemn about these "absent things" himself). Of course we could not hope to endow ourselves with those indispensable abbeys or little Norman churches, but the hopeless nostalgia for such *bijouterie* obscured what we did have: Indian antiquities; a dark and bloody ground on which men had died from Deerfield's Bloody Brook to Antietam; a flourishing colonial culture with its oncoming architects, painters, and writers; a rising industrial so-

ciety such as the world had never seen. In the rush of the late nineteenth century—to finish the conquest of a continent, mechanize agriculture, dig wealth out of farms, mines, and factories—we nearly obliterated what we had. One of the immense achievements of contemporary American archaeologists, historians, antiquarians, and the folklorists has been the recovery of so much that had all but disappeared. The restorers are sometimes too zealous (a returning ghost might lose his way in the tidiness of Williamsburg) but we have reason to be grateful for the National Parks, for Winterthur and Williamsburg, Jamestown, and Old Fort Harrod.

On the premise of Henry James we could never have a civilization because those absent abbeys would never be built. What we did get came in the wrong sizes and shapes or came disguised. We longed for an epic poet; we got Walt Whitman. We hoped for "the great American novel." Something that should have served quite as well to reassure us, *Moby-Dick*, was in its day thought to be transcendental nonsense.

This search for our physical and spiritual past has fortunately been accompanied by a growing recognition of the need to recover the lives of the men who made it. Some of them had to wait a long time, but in the past twenty years such builders of our culture (civilization, it may be) as John Smibert, Samuel McIntire, Washington Allston, Richard Upjohn, William Strickland, George Caleb Bingham, Willard Gibbs, and Charles Peirce have had their due.

In this connection it is worth noting that one of the marks of a high culture is its inexhaustibleness once the historians have begun to record and evaluate the deeds and works of the men who made it. I have not heard American historians complain about any lack of materials. Quite the contrary. To help decide who will receive the Parkman Prize for 1959 I have been reading, over the past two months, what the publishers consider their best of this year's crop of historical and biographical writing on American subjects. What amazes me is the large number of entries which are fresh and exciting, bringing up to the light forgotten men and neglected subjects in our history.

In this argument something must be said about the province in America. From reading European literature, especially French, we get the notion that the man of talent languishes in the provinces. Intelligence and imagination are not in request there and genius is thwarted. This view of provincial life (as seen in Flaubert and Stendhal, for example) will not fit America. One of the more remarkable features of our national life is the way provincial cities have grown into cosmopolitan centers. How many there are, when one begins to name them! Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, Minneapolis, San Francisco, St. Louis—this is only a start. What transforms a provincial city into a cosmopolis is the presence of a great university, a great library, an art museum, a symphony orchestra, and some theater. In such a city the young man of talent finds teachers to carry him to the point of independence, friends to enhearten him, and an audience to praise his first efforts. He will still wish to have the experience of Rome and Paris and London, but he will need New York only when he wants to see his publisher or producer or agent face to face. No other high or national culture (or civilization) has accomplished this, at least.

David M. Potter

Few people will deny that American society has developed a notable degree of distinctiveness in certain basic ways. For instance, in two centuries of rapid change throughout the world, no country has changed so rapidly as the United States. In this country, technological revolution has paced a social transformation that divorced the American people from much of their past and made them the most mobile, most adaptable, and most rootless people on the planet. Their repudiation of European ideas of hierarchy has led them to institute permissive and voluntaristic rather than coercive or authoritarian, modes of control in their social organization, and it has impelled them to place a uniquely high valuation on the personality of the individual. They

have, to a superlative degree, adjusted their values and their way of life to mechanization, so that if the world can show a true machine-age society, it is certainly in the United States. They have created and to some extent become the captives of a standard of living so high that it releases them from the bondage of toil for the necessities of life and thus makes them vulnerable to the bondage of other problems, such as that of personality adjustment. They cherish an ideal of equality but maintain in practice a class structure with invidious differences, and they attempt to reconcile the two by a system which makes the society (as distinguished from the economy) almost uniquely competitive.

Certainly these measures of distinctiveness, and others which every reader can supply for himself, make American society a fit subject for separate study. Certainly, too, they exceed the measures which set most nationality groups apart from one another. But do they warrant us in calling America a civilization? The question is well known to be a debatable one, or at least one which is debated, but does the point of controversy lie in our disagreement about American society, or in our confused use of the term civilization? Is the question substantive or is it semantic?

It is not very hard to see that the term civilization is applied indiscriminately—not to say promiscuously—at a number of different levels. At the highest level, the level at which Dr. Toynbee has used it, it designates one of the few great social systems which, through sixty centuries, have reached a full and more or less separate articulation somewhere on this planet. Most of them have developed in some degree of isolation—either of time or of space—from one another, and the ending of isolation in the modern world makes it reasonably certain that the era of great geographically-centered civilizations is almost past. At another level the term, civilization, often finds application to the cultural differentiations with which diverse nationalities may have varied their expression of one major cultural tradition—thus French civilization, British civilization, German civilization, and perhaps American civilization. Again the term has been used by some writers to emphasize the significance of differences between regions, as when Edward Channing or J. T. Adams asserted that

North and South in the United States constituted "diverse civilizations"—asserted this with utter disregard for the broad base of cultural similarities upon which relatively minor regional differences were erected.

The path to clarification is not smoothed by the fact that the term civilization has appealed to some writers as implying a degree of separateness and to others as implying a degree of advancement. Thus advocates of what may be called a cultural Monroe Doctrine like to say that the United States is a civilization in the sense of being set apart, and adverse critics of the condition of American society like to deny that it is a civilization, in the sense of being "civilized,"—both without much regard for any actual criteria of cultural measurement. It is perhaps because of considerations like these that some programs for the study of American society have adopted the deliberately nondescript term American Studies, rather than the more affirmative and more hazardous term American Civilization.

If this were purely a lexical question, I suppose it might be left to the dictionaries and be omitted from *Shenandoah*, but unfortunately it is symptomatic of a serious general problem in the study of societies, namely that we have no accepted means for holding in proper balance with one another the points of similarity which mark the continuity between given societies and the points of dissimilarity which mark their separateness. At one end of the scale, Boyd C. Shafer reminds us that human beings everywhere have a great many qualities in common; at the other end, Carl Carmer finds it plausible to say of the state of Alabama that "the Congo is not more different from Massachusetts or Kansas or California"; and there is nothing in our way of handling these matters to remind us of the one point of view when the other is about to run away with us.

Other branches of study are, I am afraid, well in advance of the study of human society in this matter. The linguists certainly have a clearer concept of the difference between a culture and a sub-culture. In fact historians tend to equate culture with nationality, attributing a distinct national character to each country which has achieved separate sovereignty, and treating these nation-

al characters as if they were more or less equally distinctive in their identity. This ignores the profound separateness with which the national culture of some countries such as Japan has developed, and the superficiality in the national variation between cultures of other countries, such as the three countries of Scandinavia or some of the republics of Central and South America. The linguists have certainly done better in dealing with the romance languages collectively than the historians have done in dealing with Mediterranean society collectively; yet there are many elements, such as the Roman law, which run through the institutions of the Mediterranean area as much as any linguistic thread runs through the speech of that area.

Students of the life sciences, zoology and botany, have succeeded best of all, for they are now in the second century of their practice of giving to every body of identical individuals—whether algae or anthropoids—a double name, including one generic name, which the body may share with other related bodies and one specific name which distinguishes it from all other bodies that are not identical. This binomial practice does not prevent students of plant and animal life from disagreeing about similarities and differences; it does not prevent some of them (known as splitters) from exaggerating the differences, nor others (known as lumpers) from exaggerating the similarities, but it does, by the juxtaposition of generic and specific names, challenge every worker to keep in mind the similarities while he is elaborating the differences or to consider the differences while he is searching for the similarities. The binomial system could, of course, never be transferred out of zoology into history, but it is a pity that no balancing question intrudes itself upon the historical investigator to temper his comparisons when on the one hand he sweepingly proclaims the universality of human nature, or, on the other asserts that American society is based upon a rejection of European values.

When he writes that Dixie and New England were as distinct in 1860 as the contrasts of agrarianism and industrialism could make them, he needs to be reminded how much evangelical morality, mercenary commercialism, frontier equalitarianism, democratic competitiveness, and jingoistic Americanism there was in both

societies. When he views American society as derivative, he needs to remember how different was the environment to which European ways were transplanted, how rapid and how sweeping was the adaptation. When, on the other hand, he fancies that American life sprang from the forest *primaeval*, someone should jog his elbow and remind him that he cannot open his mouth without Greek words, Latin words, Germanic words, and Anglo-Saxon words coming out. He cannot put pen to paper without reproducing the alphabet of the Phoenicians and the numerical system of the Arabs. He is a newcomer here, and he gets his ideas of religion from Ancient Palestine, his ideas of morality from the Old Testament prophets, his ideas of justice from ancient Rome, and his notions of liberty from Ancient Greece. Who, then, is the American, this new man?

He is a man with a society in its origins derivative, in its character very extensively adapted. The application of the term civilization implicitly denies the derivation; the withholding of the term denies the adaptation. What we need is not a verdict, awarding or enjoining the term, but a capacity to distinguish and even to designate readily the major levels of cultural differentiation, ranging from the separate universe of the Mayas to the local peculiarities of any regional or provincial society. Some terms, such as culture and sub-culture already exist, but they have not been effectively ranked to apply at commonly understood levels. So long as this deficiency in our scale of ideas and our store of words continues, civilization is likely to remain a subjective term, implicitly boasting a degree of excellence or a degree of independence, rather than an objective one indicating the ratio which prevails in American society between the distinctively American factors and the factors of homogeneity with Western culture.

Henry Nash Smith

Mr. Arnold Toynbee speaks for nearly everyone who is likely to read *Shenandoah* when he deplores the fact that the United States, which in the past could be described as the last best hope

of humanity, has now become a conservative bastion. And few of his American readers will disagree with his general thesis that "America is an extension of an old civilization flowering in a new way, and under new conditions." If we have grown conservative, we have also lost the prickly eagerness to insist upon our uniqueness that was so characteristic of nineteenth-century American nationalism.

But it hardly follows that American myths and symbols are indistinguishable from those of Britain or France or Germany. Although our symbols and ideas do indeed come out of a past which America and Europe share, the new conditions of our life have brought about different emphases and new arrangements of elements drawn from the common treasury of motives.

Mr. R. W. B. Lewis's *The American Adam*, for example, suggests how different the meaning of ancient symbols may become when they are used to interpret American experience. I think his examples show that we have been more constantly preoccupied than Europeans have been with the innocence of Adam before the Fall, with the nature of the Fall itself (was it fortunate or unfortunate?), and with the loneliness of the "lost" Adam expelled from Paradise to face a hostile world outside.

Mr. Charles Feidelson (in *Symbolism and American Literature*) has pointed out that the contrast between innocence and guilt, between ignorance and knowledge, and, perhaps most important of all, between "ideal" and "real," gave rise to an American symbolic literary mode unlike that of Europe. These are differences of emphasis rather than absolute discontinuities, but they have had the effect of giving a recognizable flavor to this "extension of the old civilization."

Henry Beston

There is a deal of discussion today in the world of books and reviews as to whether an American culture exists, or even an American civilization. *Shenandoah's* question is often asked. Assuming that an American culture exists or did exist, one will have

to admit that in the beginnings it was largely based on the English language and the civilized usages of England. Arriving on these shores, the intending colonists found only a wilderness and picturesque savages. The arriving British culture, moreover, was somewhat thin to begin with. Taking on a Puritan color, it had turned its back on the Catholicism, finery, and bravura of the Renaissance; the way of life had lost much of its formal poetry and the usages of the civilized emotions. No apparatus of culture awaited the newcomers in the new land. A culture can not exist without an apparatus, a fact which the modern destroyers of cities would do well to keep in mind. If a society wishes to welcome the muses, it must have the libraries, study halls, printing presses and other features of a functioning civilization. It is to the credit of the founders of the Puritan colonies that they early saw this need. The seventeenth century in America was intellectually and emotionally an empty period. The new inhabitants possessed their ancient and noble language (already undergoing a sea change) and little else. The community, moreover, was busy clearing fields and killing Indians.

As the colonists began to master the wilderness and have a clearer notion of where fate had brought them, the residual British culture would seem to have somewhat strengthened. The iron-clad British class system had lost something of its archaic and aristocratic rigorism; but it was still able to manipulate a society in which the class system was accepted as natural. The people at the top would seem to have lived a life based on British usages. The people underneath would seem to have had an awareness of them, but occasionally breaking through these proprieties to the world of an early Huckleberry Finn. What it is important to recall is that a class system maintained the contemporary standards and values. Enlivened with American novelties and additions, there was, one might say, a regional culture, derivative and thin though it might be.

Such culture was the popular culture of the American eighteenth century. The well-born American would arise from his imported mahogany and British chair and go on an expedition given to the use of the scalping knife. It was a culture of contrasts and

inequalities. With the lengthening of time, the American elements in the culture strengthened and grew more numerous; with the sway of the Enlightenment among the native intelligentsia there came into the population a first strong influence of the European world of ideas, and after the Revolution the culture became even more American. The bands of young white men who liked to go about in Red Indian nakedness alarming the Appalachian frontier, were induced to put on their clothes. The hereditary English language became more and more American English and was thus to remain. European visitors to America were never quite sure of where they were, but seem to have been interested in the vigorous, somewhat rowdy atmosphere. The aristocrats clung as usual to their more British standards, but the attitudes worked among them; the continent was going to have them for its own.

The great change came in the nineteenth century with the coming of the European immigrant (many of them urbanized) and the rise into prominence of Ellis Island. The writer, who recalls the era of McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, remembers well this overseas invasion of the late nineties and the nineteen hundreds, and the changes in the quality of the national "culture" which soon resulted. The population, never homogenous, became a "melting pot" (the favorite simile) of European races. The English language became increasingly picturesque and bastardized. The new arrivals, brought up in a variety of ancient cultures, adapted themselves as they could to a situation without a clear rule of life. More time elapsing, second and third generations began to appear, the new individuals (often but not always) scarce to be told from the younger people of the older stock. To use a phrase of W. B. Yeats, "conduct coarsened," and the world filled with all manners of novelties. Religion and the Christian ethic did what they could to slow the change but this was not much. The new America, the new "culture," was on its way.

Our land is full of people, some quasi illiterate, who have no knowledge whatever of the duties attendant on being a responsible human being. The rich have either become vulgarized or anglophile. There is no sign of a folk-culture anywhere; the American has never quite made his peace with America. A feminine breeze

blows across the national life, and as a character in Henry James's *The Bostonians* remarked bitterly in 1886, "The whole generation is womanized; the masculine tone is passing out of the world; it is an age of hollow phrases and false delicacy, of exaggerated solitudes and coddled sensibilities." Certain critics are even less flattering.

In this United States we live today. It has a common language which is the only great unifying power we possess. Our poly-racial cities are filling up with human hybrids such as have not been seen since the break up of the cosmopolitanism of imperial Rome. It has, strictly speaking, no true culture. What it has, and the reader must here pardon a certain vagueness of terms, is a "way of life." Genuine standards and values do not exist. Until they appear and are heeded, we shall be a vast and restless population living in social tension in a world ruled by the machine.

What then, does keep the community together? Is it not the American sense of social freedom, the American generosity, the American *bonhomie*? These never appear to fail. Common sense may go by the board, the trained intelligence falter; but the American *bonhomie* lives on solid ground. If one is a "good mixer" there is, perhaps, no more agreeable place on earth in which to live. The disciplined mind may wish that it could absent itself awhile from violence and the search for comfort, but it has to make the best of it. And out of generosity and social friendliness something very fine may ultimately arise.

Louis D. Rubin, Jr.

One is reminded of the French military communique: "The situation is hopeless, but it is not serious." Only it turned out to be both, and nowadays we have General DeGaulle and M. Sartre. I am more concerned about M. Sartre; the French do not, after all, take the General very seriously. They take M. Sartre entirely too seriously. Mr. Toynbee sounds (I am sure *this* is something he hasn't thought about) too much like M. Sartre. What he says about

American civilization is so logical; it is difficult to refute any particular enthymeme in his diagnosis. One can only deny the whole thing.

Deny, that is, the importance of the question, "Is America a civilization?" For of course we are civilized, in the loose way in which that word is thrown about nowadays. On the other hand we are part of Western civilization, too; Mr. Toynbee mentions Scott Fitzgerald, while I cite Sartre, and meanwhile both Sartre and Alberto Moravia discuss William Faulkner. There is a line of division, and there isn't, and if any good is to be found in trying to decide where it stops or starts, I don't know what it is. Let us not battle each other over fond abstractions; there are too many specific annoyances at hand.

For when Mr. Toynbee first asserts that there is nothing importantly unique about America, and that we delude ourselves if we attempt to examine our country as being in any way set apart from western civilization as a whole; and then when shortly thereafter he points to our growing conformity, our loss of our revolutionary zeal, our disturbing regressive symptom—is he not seeking to deny us a possible remedy for our deficiencies? I mean, if we think we are brave and bold and are not, if we think we are individualists and are not, if we think we are evangelistic and are not, then is it not desirable and more than that, essential, that we do our very best to figure out *what* we are, and how we got there? Is not the remedy for those shortcomings precisely what Mr. Toynbee would deny us: self-consciousness, self-analysis, continued, searching reappraisal? In all humility, how can we ever understand ourselves if we insist that there is nothing here worth individual attention, nothing that is not equally true of all western peoples as well? There is humility, and then there is naivete; they are not synonymous.

It is quite true that, could such things be weighed and balanced, John Calvin and Plato may be far more important than Jonathan Edwards and Woodrow Wilson in the development of the American mentality. Yet surely that is no reason to ignore the specific role of the Calvinist Churches in American life. What Mr. Toynbee really objects to, I think, is the tendency in American

civilization programs to leave out Calvin and Plato and to concentrate exclusively and dully upon the New England theological awakening and Democratic Party politics in New Jersey. The tendency exists; it is all too prevalent. The culprit is not American self-consciousness, but myopic professors. American studies do not exclude either Plato or Woodrow Wilson's term as governor of New Jersey; any American studies program worth its salt includes both kinds of inquiry, and tries to spy out the relationship.

There is nothing inherently wrong with American studies. It is simply that, as in all fields of inquiry, the ratio of light to heat is never very efficient. The difficulty comes in the failure of the human being to use what little intelligence he has developed over the millenia. In this respect professors of American studies are equally as unsatisfactory as American advertising salesmen, Oxford dons, and French journalists.

Of course we are a nation of near-sighted Rotarians with short memories, and of course we fail to live up to what we say we believe in. Yet I do not think we can profitably go about worrying about Conformity, and Insularity, and Blind Worship of Technology. That is what the French do, or what they think they do, and I cannot discern any notable improvement therefrom. We must concentrate on understanding and remedying *this* particular blindness, and *that* failure to think, and *this* aesthetic deprivation, and *that* bit of smugness. "He would do good to another must do it in minute particulars," and the kind of soaring generalizations that Mr. Toynbee has tossed out so glibly fail to disturb me very much—almost as little as do those of Max Lerner, who lacks Mr. Toynbee's saving leaven of irony.

Yes, Mr. Toynbee, we are in a mess. No, Mr. Toynbee, we do not realize it nearly well enough. We are a pretty ignorant bunch of human beings over here. I hope God will have mercy upon us, much more than we deserve. Meanwhile, *il faut cultiver notre jardin*, as a well-known zealot once remarked.

John Hague

America's story is a unique one, made up of the thousand and one dreams which her diverse people have held and implemented. It is the story of an experiment which began in isolation, involved itself in the problems of many, and emerged as a way of life.

Undoubtedly America is, in one sense, a part of a much larger civilization. The day of the geographically isolated civilization has passed, and American civilization happened to grow up at that special moment in history when a revolution in transportation, industry and communication destroyed the possibility of achieving a wholly distinct cultural personality. Yet America's saga did begin in isolation. Otherwise the early settlers could not have started their Holy Commonwealths or local assemblies. The very fact that men had to undertake a voyage of three thousand miles to become a part of one of these experiments served to give an especially powerful focus to their newly developing loyalties.

The problem of studying American civilization is unavoidable, for nationalism has been and remains the great cohesive force of the modern world, and the nation state the political unit which has gathered and focused the loyalties of men everywhere. Men came to the new world for a variety of reasons; one detects paradoxes in the writings of most colonists. The Puritans, for example, were religious conservatives and economic radicals, bent upon proving their subservience and their freedom. It is significant that America was far enough away from Europe to permit bands of determined and willful men to establish colonies without interference. There was indeed a clash of interests which led to laws and smuggling; but Jamestown and Salem were much farther removed from the man who walked London's streets than any city in the world stands today from the man who inhabits New York. Even so, the colonists had ultimately to fight to continue their experiments in democracy independently.

As for our American Revolution, how revolutionary was it? Did it really mark a turning point in the history of the West? Should the nations of Europe have supported England without hesitation

in an effort to crush a movement which was destined to turn the world upside down? This proposition can be defended, and many who are frightened by the apparent weaknesses of modern democracy may wish to do so. But the fact remains that the American Revolution was, in part, a conservative attempt to realize certain values that lay at the heart of western history. The patriots of the American Revolution were fighting to reconcile new opportunities with old traditions and values. Thus the Revolution symbolizes both America's isolation from, and her bond with, Europe.

Although the war had revolutionary effects for political and social structures, it brought a form of government into being in a land of abundance which made it possible to conserve ancient values. One of the major revolutionary voices, Jefferson, insisted that revolutions were required to perpetuate the truths by which men live. One might argue further that the values of the Western Tradition can only be conserved through a process of extension. Certainly a premise of the liberal tradition within American democratic thought has been that widening opportunities must be extended to growing throngs of people.

America has grown up as a symbol of expanding opportunity, and has done much to validate the symbol. Whenever a group has arisen which would restrict the nation's bounties to a chosen few, the protest has been sharp and clear. America has indeed a conscience and has been remarkably faithful to the tenets of the democratic creed. The existence of this conscience has made possible a dangerous idolatry which includes but extends beyond material possessions. America has been so successful that her citizens tend to idolize not merely their wealth but the men and institutions which have made their prosperity possible. The announcement that the next war may produce an untold number of casualties is greeted with indifference; but a casual observation that it may deprive us of the use of our automobiles arouses consternation. In such circumstances, we find it difficult to believe that the underlying values of our life may survive and even flourish in the midst of seeming chaos. Stated quite simply, we have a tendency to value our way of life for its own sake rather than for the opportunity for service which it makes possible.

Our liberal tradition has periodically been identified with a standard of living, but the American conscience has repeatedly reclaimed this liberalism and directed its attention to the unfulfilled promises of the American Creed. The point is extremely important: we are phenomenally complacent, but wherever one touches American history he finds critics protesting against smugness and the status quo.

The American conscience, however muted by prosperity, is the hope of the world. Who is likely to be more concerned about the misery and degradation of human life on vast portions of the earth's surface than the aroused American? And who can be more quickly aroused than the American who takes seriously his democratic faith? The problem is obviously complex. The sympathies and moral fiber of the American conscience have had a national focus. Remove that lens and they may have no focus at all. The nineteenth century American understood perfectly that he had a world-mission, but it was to be fulfilled on American soil. He had to preserve the example of a democratic government. Now he is asked to underwrite the hope of a better life for people who will never come to his land, nor understand his treasured documents and institutions. The challenge is unmistakable. The outcome of the Cold War depends upon the ability of the American to deny himself to such an extent that he may become the instrument of enlarging the opportunities of people who live in towns and countries he never heard of.

In short, the American must rediscover a truth. To save his life he must be prepared to lose it. Only by risking his standard of living in an all-out effort can he hope to preserve the values which created his way of life.

What are those values and where are they rooted? Each person will answer in his own way, but I contend that one cannot talk about such matters without referring to the tradition of Puritanism. Puritanism was not uniquely American, but in New England the Puritans had their greatest opportunity and left their strongest imprint. They believed they were called by God to glorify Him through the use of the talents He had furnished. The Puritan, at his best, understood that he was not personally re-

sponsible for the final outcome of the struggle in which he engaged. His justification was by faith. In the Perseverance of the Saints he found a concept which fortified him in failure and humbled him in success. He understood, much as he desired worldly success, that the kingdom for which he prayed and worked was an eternal kingdom in which the supreme victory had already been won. Man's chief end was not his own comfort, but "to glorify God and enjoy him forever."

America perverted the whole concept. True, but Lincoln reclaimed it once, and Americans are in a position to reclaim it again. The prophets are not silent. Can they be heard? The Christian answers, only through the Grace of God, and adds: "His Kingdom is forever."

William Jordy

Matthew Arnold once defined civilization as the "humanization of man in society." If Arnold's definition offers the disadvantage of substituting one formidable term for another, it possesses the merit of succinctly presenting the major ingredients in any discussion of civilization. However elaborate the exploration of this theme, it revolves on *man* in his response to *society* in those intellectual, esthetic and moral aspects which distinguish the *human* animal.

Now if we ask whether there is such an entity as an "American civilization," the purest response must be negative. With Professor Toynbee, we must acknowledge that American civilization is merely a frontier of western European civilization. After all, the country is only recently redeemed from a wilderness state by Europeans and their descendents, and those more interested in material than in intellectual, esthetic or spiritual accomplishments. How could the United States possibly have produced a unique civilization? And especially when the country developed during a period of such profound technological and social upheaval that even European civilization, particularly in the twentieth century, substantially coasts on past magnificence?

To shrink the question and parallel Toynbee's argument again, the problem becomes one rather of the existence and quality of an American variant of western European civilization. A double question this. First, does an American variant exist? Then, if it does, what is its quality? Most Europeans would admit that an American sub-culture (they frequently hesitate with Toynbee to dignify it with the word "civilization") does exist. European intellectuals fear its mass appeal. European masses, while often joining in the fashionable derision of Coca Colonization, embrace the Cokes, the movies, the advertising and all the gimmicks they can afford. (So, covertly, do many of the intellectuals, who, like their American counterparts, find themselves caught up more than they wish in the mass produced items and attitudes of twentieth-century western civilization.) Most Europeans, then, do admit a uniquely American variant of western European civilization; and those who ponder the problem at all are generally condescending about its merit.

By way of retort, the American has adduced statistics on the sales of recordings of classical music, on museum and concert attendance, on the burgeoning publication of quality writing in paperbacks, and so on. Such statistics, while significant, are nevertheless an argument of last resort for anyone who wishes to demonstrate the existence of a high culture. They demonstrate a will to consume high culture, but say nothing about the ability to create it. As for the creativity of his contemporary culture, the American might cite the visual arts as an example, which come first to mind because I am personally familiar with them. The United States is today, all things considered, the most creative country in the world in the visual arts—a surprising development which one could hardly have predicted as short a time as two decades ago. A comparable (or near comparable) level of achievement might be discerned in other areas: in poetry and criticism, if not in drama and the novel; in the dance perhaps; in jazz of course, musical comedy, and less certainly in "serious" music; in many areas of scholarship and professionalism. It has suddenly become as important for the intelligent European to visit the United States as it remains important for Americans to travel

abroad. At last a healthy balance begins to appear in the American's attitude toward his European background. Neither does he need to run from America in chagrin at the crudeness of its frontier culture, nor does he need to overcompensate for this escape by burrowing into its provincialities in search of their "uniquely American" flavor.

Finally, the American might proudly note the number of Europeans who, from the thirties onward, have found the United States a congenial place in which to work. If their achievements are not narrowly "American," while as many (more perhaps) came to this country for the material advantages which it offers as for the freedom of inquiry which it encourages. But high civilizations of the past have always depended on the immigration of intelligentsia who selfishly sought a tolerable material and spiritual environment in which to do their work.

Certainly these cultural phenomena might be cited either as promise or achievement by way of counterweighing much that is so stridently banal in modern America. In another symposium, it would be fascinating for specialists to weigh the specifically "American" contributions in these cultural phenomena. In other words, those facets of a cosmopolitan development which seem particularly dependent upon the "American" environment in which they occur. But if we remain with the problem of modern American civilization in a panoramic sense, the most unusual aspect of the contemporary American variant of Western European civilization is its attempt to democratize what has hitherto been the privilege of a few. This democratization of high culture represents the most challenging aspect of American cultural life today, freighted as it is with prospects of both triumph and catastrophe.

It appears conspicuously in the sudden demand, since World War II, for college and university education. The same trend is observable throughout the world; but no where does it occur with anything like the vehemence which it shows in this country. The college degree, and the professional degrees which increasingly follow, are prized for the vocational and marital advantages they confer. With so many seeking entrance to college, certainly the

goals for most will not loom astonishingly high. We should not hope for too much from a burgeoning college and university population. Quite the contrary. Since over-optimism is an American poison which kills off the critical spirit, it is safer to begin by deploring the onslaught. Then we shall not be oblivious to the perils of popularization on the campus.

The American college and university professor already reels in hydraheaded bewilderment at expectations that he will be (1) a popular lecturer, (2) a profound scholar, (3) a competent administrator, (4) a sympathetic counselor and, if possible, (5) a hail-fellow-well-met, who can mix at Kiwanis and alumni luncheons and occasionally perform on TV to assist in university public relations. Further to enlarge the non-academic periphery of these expectations at the expense of the professor's primary concern for rigorous research and strenuous teaching by filling classrooms with lackadaisical students can very likely ruin the universities.

The "equal opportunity" ideal may be perverted at the college level as it has been at the public high school level by a rampant materialism coupled with an exaggerated concern for the dim-witted and half-hearted. If "equal opportunity" is thus to bow to the consumption ethic of American advertising, then the universities are doomed to the same glittering mediocrity of so much that is shallowest in our civilization. If, on the other hand, "equal opportunity" becomes the ideal that it should be as it extends to the upper reaches of education, then the universities will foster the opportunity for each student to realize his own individual potential in all its uniqueness. In so doing, they will instill an awareness of that excellence which a report on education sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation specifies as the great need in American teaching today.

With such an enlightened interpretation, the "equal opportunity" of higher education for all who are capable of profiting by it could well revolutionize American culture. If we can hope that most who emerge from such a regimen will at least provide enthusiastic support for a high culture, many will become its creators. Together, both groups may make a dent in the chrome-crested fender in its flight to the junk pile.

Let us not be over-optimistic. Better to be pessimistic in the hope that desperate counter-measures against our worst fears may give cause for eventual joy. In any event, the surge for higher education, so profoundly in keeping with our cultural traditions, represents the most promising development toward a civilized America.

From the larger perspective of the impact of American idealism on the world (now so tragically eclipsed as Toynbee and other sympathetic foreign observers have indicated), this idealism can only reassert itself as a global force when we reawaken as a people to the humanistic values on which it rests. Only then can the American democratic tradition topple a platitudinous materialism which alternates between ad-men's slogans and desperate hand-outs, while Americans are off to the golf links, the harbors, the highways, the coffee break and TV. From a world-wide perspective, finally, the American experiment in the democratization of high culture is especially significant since, like it or not, this is everywhere the trend of the future. Where quantity reigns supreme, can quality survive outside the coterie? If this problem is an old one in speculations as to the merit and promise of "American civilization," it has never been more forcefully posed than in the present clamor for higher education.

Marcus Cunliffe

Here is a question that makes me groan. In part because it is one of those treadmill questions of our time that cannot be satisfactorily answered, yet which allow us no respite since we must try to find an answer. In part, too, because I suspect most of the contributors to this symposium, including myself, will come up with the same double answer: a yes and a no.

To deal first with the sort of inquiry that leads to a negative answer, the approach in this instance is theoretical. The investigator seeks a definition of "civilization." Let us suppose that he equates "civilization" with "culture," more or less, and that he thinks of culture in the sense both of humanistic achievement and

of societal pattern. Whatever the precise definition, he will then look for the unique combination of values and institutions that differentiates one putative civilization from another; and also for some less easily evaluated marks of power, durability, coherence, excellence, that entitle the "civilization" to special consideration. If our perspective in time and space be large enough, we shall no doubt end up with a list on the Toynbee scale.

On such a list I do not think the United States would have a separate entry. We should group it with Europe, probably, and call the whole a "Western" or possibly a "North Atlantic" civilization. The United States, that is, is not yet very distinct from Europe. American culture initially *was* that of Europe. The original heritage has been reinforced by close and continuing association. Of course the process has worked in both directions, America influencing Europe as well as *vice versa*. But that does not yet entitle us to write Europe off as an American cultural appendage. The North Atlantic civilization exhibits a great deal of regional variation. In a broad view, however, the similarities are more evident and more important than the dissimilarities. The American contribution to the total culture has not been negligible, especially in literature, in various aspects of popular culture (most notably music), in business techniques and in what might be called practical democracy. Yet this is not so dominant a contribution that it reverses or overshadows what Europe permanently endowed as Western culture and mores, or what Europe has since added to the endowment (Marx, Darwin, Freud, Picasso: the roll of names could be extended almost indefinitely).

To make such a point is not to dismiss American civilization as imitative or unworthy, but simply to contend that the United States, in the perspective of world history, does not so far constitute a separate major civilization. *So far*. Clearly, the American influence is likely to become more and more pervasive, not just in Europe but throughout the world. We are not concerned with prophecy, though, and though haruspicing and scrying have been typical features of American discussions about America. It is equally likely that the world, if it survives, will never again witness the emergence of separate major civilizations. It is more plausible

to assume that it will present the spectacle of a grand amalgam, of one technological, mass-culture social system. True, there may long remain self-conscious and probably antipathetic sub-societies, with marked cultural differences. But it is not relevant to our present debate (nor by any means a foregone conclusion) to consider whether future technocracies will necessarily recognize themselves as "American" in provenance.

Why, then, bother to raise the issue? In order to lead to the other, affirmative kind of answer. In terms of this second type of argument, indeed, "Is America a Civilization?" might be treated as merely a rhetorical question. This approach to the problem, instead of being sweeping and theoretical, is briskly pragmatic. What sense, its proponents might ask, is there in enumerations which all relate to the past? Is this not to set up a closed shop of civilizations? If, in nearing the present, we must define our civilizations so broadly as to lump Europe and North America together, then are not such definitions too loosely comprehensive to be of any use? What can we do with big, vague platitudes? We know perfectly well that the United States has had and still has much in common with Europe: to study the two continents is a fascinating and valuable exercise. We also know from, plain observation, that America has evolved all kinds of customs and attitudes that owe nothing directly to Europe, that can be understood only with close reference to the actualities of the American scene. It is feasible to study them thus: it is worthwhile, as an academic pursuit and even as a moral quest.

The pragmatist may widen his argument, though at the apparent liability of losing it. He may go on to assert that after 1789 America for practical purposes always has been a distinct civilization, just because after 1789 nearly every American *assumed* that it was. Millions of children, at performances of *Peter Pan*, have shown their belief in fairies by clapping for Tinkerbell; and sure enough, Tinkerbell's light has grown stronger, at least for that theatrical moment. Millions of Americans have believed in the differentness, the uniqueness of their country, ever since it became a country; and sure enough, their reiterated conviction has had real consequences. What matter that much of their culture *was* de-

rivative? The significant fact was that few Americans realized it. What they had absorbed became American, and was steadily transformed. No need to invoke the frontier thesis, except as one more symptom of the American national myth, according to which the New World had repudiated and superceded the Old. Believe long enough and fervently enough in the *novus ordo saeculorum*, in the inevitable westward course of empire (the first volume of Bancroft's patriotic history, published in 1834, had Bishop Berkeley's celebrated line stamped on the front cover: what matter, again, that it was slightly misquoted?)—only believe, and America emerges as a viable, studiable, American-Studiable entity.

The God's-eye view, which leads us to answer the main question with a somewhat querulous negative, has its limitations. There is no need to dwell on the dangers of the pragmatic position, which can guide us to a booming affirmative. Seen properly, its dangers are also its delights. The American civilization is a connoisseur's possession. To examine it adequately calls for humor, sophistication, a capacity to be moved by and to relish veneers, shams, fakes, to appreciate the amazing antiqueness of only yesterday, to resist being taken in—and yet to avoid being left out, by lack of insight, cultural orthodoxy, doctrinaire disapproval. In the one approach we are apt to choke on Great Books. In the other the risk is of starving on Small Books or Goodish Books masquerading as America's own micro-macrocosm. Mercifully we do not have to choose. We can and must have both.

Yves Couderc

When I told an American friend that I was going to the United States, he said, "I hope you won't be disappointed." A second American remarked: "I am sure you won't like it."

These two spontaneous remarks puzzled me. Why is it that Americans, who give the impression of being so sure of themselves, are frequently embarrassed when they talk to Europeans—especially when dealing with the question of their own civilization?

Surely it is not that they are less civilized than Europeans, if by that term we mean a craving for a more beautiful and a more useful life. No people spend more than Americans to make life happier, not only in their own country, but in other countries as well. At the same time that they deplore Europe's antiquated plumbing and obsolete custom barriers, they admire it for something they think they haven't got: a certain "way of life," treasures of everlasting beauty, a feeling of oneness with a marvelous past.

The main reason for this is to be found in the fact that as a nation, the United States started by a rupture with Europe. Obviously the War of Independence was a political rupture. Then came waves of immigration, all actuated by a desire to break away from Europe for economic, political, or religious reasons. This had two consequences. The first was an imperious need for uniformity and quick assimilation. No one was more anxious to look "American" than the immigrant who had just cleared Ellis Island. His ideal was not to stand out but to blend; his children would be American. The second was an inevitable rise to leadership of the Anglo-Saxon community. Immediate integration meant the quick acquisition of the English language and the Anglo-Saxon way of life. Not by chance were the first two Americans who attained world-wide fame in the realm of letters and painting—Harriet Beecher-Stowe and James Whistler—both of Anglo-Saxon stock. The non-Anglo-Saxons had to copy, never a good situation for the creative mind. The result was the dreary nineteenth century, during which America copied everything that could be copied, particularly in architecture. The result was sheer catastrophe: look at St. Patrick's, which passes for architecture in New York.

Fortunately that condition was not to last forever. By 1900, the United States had acquired a solid technique in many branches of human activity. The time had come to use it to *create* great and bold things. America was by now strong enough to assert itself not merely as a kind of enlarged England which could have willy-nilly swallowed great masses of nondescript Europeans, but as a new and creative nation. The results were very encouraging: it was the time of the first skyscrapers.

Today we may smile at the Gothic cornices of the early ones; but undoubtedly, *there* was something new and strong. Now, look at one side of Fifth Avenue, with Rockefeller Center across from St. Patrick's. Who can say that today Americans are unable to create grandeur and beauty?

Yet these successes, based on new and efficient technique, are pregnant with grave consequences, if artists and engineers are not watchful. Mere technique cannot lead to real art, and the temptation will be towards something always "er" (bigger, higher, longer, faster, etc.). This brings on gigantism, a classified disease.

To reach the upper level of civilization, America must think in terms of the Acropolis rather than on the Coliseum. This isn't easy: great empires did not manage it; if we look to Rome for superb technique, we must go back to Greece for real beauty, or forward to the French thirteenth century or the golden Quattrocento. Why? Because technique is soon outmoded; real art and true civilization, never. We laugh at 1900 model cars. We don't laugh at the early efforts of Fra Angelico or of the unknown artists who sculptured Chartres. In all these cases we see early efforts at applying a new technique. In the last two instances, technique was not an end in itself, but a tool toward self expression. Mere technique is dead: but a *message*, be it in stone, in oil, in verse, in music, coming from a man of flesh and blood who experienced life—this is immortal.

Delivering such a message is not easy; it will always be a hard struggle. Technical achievements are so gratifying. They show their usefulness so evidently; they are so obvious. The temptation will always be to stop here, smugly satisfied with what is already accomplished. There must be men who will always try to reach something beyond and above, through hard and painful struggling, and bring it down to their brothers who will probably jeer at them. Dreamer—parasite—crank will be the mildest of the many charges. They will not be "useful" citizens, nor worthy denizens of the ant-hill. Yet even if their feet are not firmly rooted in the ground, their gaze will reach up to a star to decipher its immortal message. They will interpret it to these who, unknowingly, need it so badly in this oppressive, efficient, soul-killing world of today.

That is what Americans must understand: having technique at their disposal, having gone far beyond inevitable imitation, they can now create boldly and originally and thus take their place among the founders of great civilizations.

George Shepperson

In crossing the Atlantic the whole face of nature appears to change, and one is literally translated into a new world. Scarcely anything here resembles the corresponding objects in Europe. The very business of life is left out. With you (in Europe) it is the ambition of the young to make their way among men, but here it is their ambition to make their way into the wood. Prudence and caution are requisite in the former while mere strength of arm is sufficient in the latter—a circumstance which may perhaps enable us to explain why a sense of subordination is produced in Europe while the spirit of independence is nurtured in America.¹

In these words from his unpublished history of America, Andrew Brown, third holder of the Chair of Rhetoric and Belles Lettres at Edinburgh University, anticipated Frederick Jackson Turner by nearly a century. Unlike Edinburgh's famous pioneer historian of America, William Robertson, Brown's analysis of the New World was based on practical experience, for he spent eight years in North America. As one reads his comments, one wonders what would happen to America when the woods had gone—the very problem which Jefferson raised in a letter to Madison of 1787, the year in which Brown set sail for America. Jefferson's answer is a famous one but it still merits quotation:

When we get piled up upon one another in large cities, as in Europe, we shall become corrupt as in Europe, and go to eating one another as they do there.

Without indulging in melancholy reflections on this theme or treading again the well-worn paths of the Frontier controversy,

¹Edinburgh University Mss., Andrew Brown, SRA 6. I am indebted to Miss Ann Lyn Hanson, 1957-58 Fulbright scholar at Edinburgh University, for drawing my attention to this passage.

it is yet valid to point out that such sentiments envisage the time when America would begin to move towards Europe again; when there would be little to choose between it and Europe but size, variety and material prosperity. (To-day, when so much is heard about the conformity of the young in America, it is not out of place to pause and consider that, a century and a half ago, an inconspicuous Edinburgh professor gave as a characteristic of Europe "the ambition of the young to make their way among men" which produces an attitude of "prudence and caution.") From this angle, indeed, the question of America's cultural identity might be raised not in the form, "Is there an American civilization?" but "Was there an American civilization?"

Obviously, to put the problem in this way is to risk caricature. Yet such a posing of the question does stress the fact that it has been raised most acutely at a time when America, often unwillingly, has been forced into closer relations with Europe.

To a European, America's search for identity often seems tiresome. It appears to represent a quest for self which Europe, in its reaction against the Romantic movement, gave up long ago in despair. To be sure, disillusionment with America and all the hopes that it represented has played no small part in this. As John Keats put it, when he was criticizing the naive optimism which centred impossible hopes on America—and when, perhaps, his vision was colored by the belief that Audubon, the naturalist, had sold George Keats, his emigrant brother, a boat load of merchandise which, at the time of the sale, Audubon knew to be at the bottom of the Mississippi—

These Americans are great but they are not sublime Man—the humanity of the United States can never reach the sublime.

To Keats, what mattered for America was its capacity to grow in the imagination. Anticipating *Democratic Vistas*, he wrote to his brother in 1818:

If I had a prayer to make for any great god... it should be that one of your Children should be the first American Poet.

Such disillusionment goes back to the beginnings of the American experience and would seem to be an essential counterpart of

the dream of America as the "leap of faith" forward in human community and imagination. America, indeed, was born by hap-hazard and hoax out of hope, if Columbus' accidental discovery and the naming of the continent after Vespucci who did not discover it and deceived his contemporaries about the extent of his voyaging are anything to go by! All three elements—hope, hap-hazard and hoax—are interwoven in Shakespeare's American parable, *The Tempest*, which concludes with a frank confession by that master of transatlantic "know-how," Prospero, that human agencies cannot achieve the high hopes of the New World. In his words,

... my ending is despair,
Unless I be relieved by prayer

—a sentiment which seems to reach forward over the centuries to that of another exile across the Atlantic, W. H. Auden, who wrote in his *New Year Letter* of 1942 that

... true democracy begins
With free confession of our sins.

America's own parable, of course, is *Huckleberry Finn*. Huck's concluding cry,

... she's going to adopt me and sivilise me, and I can't stand it. I been there before

is a parable in itself at a time when America is being overtaken by the rest of the world as much as, if not more than she is overtaking it. His complaint, moreover, indicates the essential American problem which, like all America's problems belongs also to Europe and the world as a whole: can freedom exist in society? Though he was thinking of other things when he wrote it, this couplet from John Donne expresses the dilemma well:

Oh my Americal my new-found-land,
My kingdom, safest when with one man manned.

This ancient question is at the heart of America, for America owes much of its existence to the attempt to solve it. All other considerations are largely peripheral. The machine has no nationality: Marx chose wrongly when he asserted that it is the working-man who has no country. The corporation, Organization

Man, materialism, speed, Progress and all the other kindred entities which are claimed as America's contribution to humanity have their counterparts in the Old World. America's distinction is the scale on which these things exist: and this is a quantitative mark. The qualitative distinction of American civilization must be sought, if at all, in the challenge of values, the spiritual as much as the material opportunity which it has presented to mankind. To quote Auden again:

More even than in Europe, here
The choice of patterns is made clear
Which the machine imposes, what
Is possible and what is not,
To what conditions we must bow
In building the Just City now.

To believe otherwise is to echo Melville's agonized cry: "Columbus ended earth's romance."

So long as the question, "What is American civilization?", remains a *search* America will be safe, however much war-weary Europeans may see in it the eternal cycle of the Romantic Agony. Europeans, indeed, should welcome the quest; for it means that the questioning and probing of values is being kept alive at a time when the lamps in Europe, if they are not going out, are flickering dangerously.

If, however, the question, "What is American civilization," becomes not a search but an arid analysis, then it will be a sure sign that the Closed Society has come to America. "We murder to dissect." America was and is, and must be if she is to continue to remain America, a continuing quest for the extension of freedom amongst many and varied peoples. The process was, is and will increasingly be encompassed with discouragement and self-contradiction. But it must continue. If it stopped, then, in William Blake's words,

had America been lost, o'erwhelmed by the Atlantic
And Earth had lost another portion of the infinite.

THE AMERICAN BOOKSHELF

To provide a picture of present-day American civilization and its origins, the Carnegie Foundation recently asked fifteen well-read Americans to choose 350 basic books. Sets of the books have gone around the world, and the short introductions to each book which the experts wrote have been put into a volume called *American Panorama* (New York University Press). "It represents," writes Eric Larrabee, "the conviction that there is such a thing as the American culture;" and it makes a useful and readable volume for the American Bookshelf.

The stream of books which attempt a general survey of American life and history rolls on, but few match for perspicacity and clarity the two-volume Pelican *History of the United States* (Penguin Books A 313-314).

Some of those same ideas appear, more naughtily and breezily, in John Keats' *The Crack in the Picture Window* (Houghton Mifflin) which traces the history of John Drone, onward and downward, to the abyssal boredom of the housing developments that are blighting the landscape and souls of America's suburbs. Here is the reality that confronts Sumner H. Slichter's rosy dream in *Technology and the Great American Experiment* (University of Wisconsin Press): "Ours is a society in which—thanks to technology—leisure, education, and incomes are growing. Here obviously are the makings of a cultural revolution."

Harry S. Ashmore, the courageous editor of the *Arkansas Gazette*, does not welcome it enthusiastically. Instead, he writes *An Epitaph for Dixie* (W. W. Norton). "I agreed . . . that New York no longer had any boundaries," he states. "For New York is not simply an uncomfortable place to live and work in, but a state of mind, and in that sense there is nothing left now to confine it, no physical barriers and no permanent, distinctive regional attitude. I was at peace with New York not because I had conquered it, or tried to, but because I had surrendered; like my grandfathers I had turned in my sword because the invasion was complete and I had nothing left to defend."

David Riesman

PRIVATE PEOPLE AND PUBLIC POLICY

Let me begin with two experiences which helped to heighten for me my sense of the mythologies concerning public opinion which grip many intelligent people. The first experience occurred at a meeting last year of a committee on education set up by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. On the particular occasion I have in mind, our committee was discussing the nature of its prospective report, and one of the members was raising the perennial question about how we could get our ideas into the hands of people at large. He insisted that he did not think that we should just be talking to each other and to "people like us," but should make our report short and punchy, free of ambiguities, so that it could be popularly understood and widely effective. As I looked around the room it occurred to me that this man had an audience for his ideas on education beyond what could have been his wildest dreams a few years earlier, for he is still a comparatively young man. Around the table were the presidents of several of our major universities, the presidents of some of the most influential foundations, a leading journalist in the field of education, and several of the country's principal specialists on manpower problems, in and out of government. Thanks to Sputnik and the clamor for more scientists and engineers, and thanks to the running attack many of the major media have been waging against progressive education in the high schools, education did not seem to me to be suffering from lack of the journalistic spotlight, but it did seem to be suffering from a lack of influential examples. It was my own belief that if one could change the minds of the people on the panel, one could have a far greater impact on education than if one produced a document which, in diluted form, reached some amorphous and uninterested public. In fact, much of the talk with which the media were already filled did not get through to the mass public, anymore than other such talk does. Yet my

colleague at the table seemed prevented, by his own decency and his democratic ideology, from realizing this. Too modest on behalf of himself and his group, he didn't like to think that on the topics he cared about the people he was with mattered more than the people not in the room. He seemed to me like some of the officials in the United States Information Agencies and the Voice of America who, in countries dominated by a dictator or a small elite, nevertheless keep trying to get their messages across to voiceless peasants and other at least presently powerless folk. The "nice American" makes no special claims and wants feedback from the many, not the few.

My other experience is perhaps more directly relevant to our concerns at this meeting. In the spring of 1956, Louis Harris, one of the most intelligent and enterprising of public opinion pollers, brought Stewart Alsop to Chicago on one leg of a journey through the Midwest to introduce him both to polling techniques and to what the "man in the street" was thinking about the forthcoming election. All that year, as you will remember, the Alsop brothers had been hammering in their column that the Eisenhower Administration was lagging behind the country in its lack of concern with the danger of Soviet advances and in its budget-mindedness. They had ferociously assailed what they considered the complacency of Washington. One nice spring morning I went out with Harris on his polling expedition into a new middle-class suburb south of Chicago. He would knock on the door and ask the housewife (or

Author's Note. The paper presented herewith was prepared for a small informal conference on foreign policy held at Yaddo near Saratoga Springs under the auspices of the American Friends Service Committee in September, 1958. The Conference grew out of an effort to stem the feelings of hopelessness many thoughtful Americans have when they consider foreign policy in the age of the hydrogen bomb (and of other less publicized potentialities for total destruction). I was asked to lead a discussion about whether individual citizens could do anything whatever to influence foreign policy, and whether in general it was more difficult today than heretofore to arouse public opinion.

The paper was not written with an eye to publication. Rather, it was intended as an illustrated summary for non-social scientists of some of the things social scientists believe they have discovered concerning public opinion (including public opinion about public opinion). It goes without saying that the paper expresses my own judgments and fancies and not those of the Conference.

the occasional man who was home working around his place) how he or she had voted in 1952. Virtually all had voted for Ike and some had trouble in remembering who it was who had run against Ike. Harris would ask them whom they had voted for in the senatorial campaign of 1954, which had been very strenuous in Illinois, and he would have to prod many to remember that it was Meek who had run against Senator Douglas. Then he would ask what they thought about Ike's illness (this was after the first of his attacks), whether they thought this was a problem; many would say that their Aunt Minnie or Uncle Ben had had similar heart trouble and yet managed to get around: indeed, I concluded that if Ike got more diseases he would gather more votes! Sometimes Harris would say, "Well, you've heard about criticisms of the President for playing too much golf and for being a part-time President: what do you think about that?" The very idea irritated many people: they would say, "If I had that job I'd play golf too." It was clear that, as more formal surveys done at The Survey Research Center had revealed earlier, people tended to see the Presidency in terms of personalities, not in terms of issues or responsibilities.

This came out even more clearly when Mr. Harris asked respondents whether the Republicans or the Democrats had done anything lately that they had especially liked or disliked. They would scratch their heads and think for a moment, and at times they would say that they had liked the ending of the war in Korea, or that they disliked high taxes; but often they had to reach for a slogan in order to respond, and there was little animus in what they said.

Occasionally, Harris would ask if they liked McCarthy, and if they said yes he might also ask if they liked Kefauver. What struck me particularly was that if they liked one they often liked the other and for the same reason: these men were dramatic, entertaining, not "politicians," but on the contrary against the politicians. You may remember that Stewart Alsop wrote in his columns that he was shaken by this; that Washington, far from being behind the country, was far ahead, living in a climate of concern

and activism and attention that was not matched in the complacency and optimism he had seen on his trip.

Certainly it was my own experience that, looking over the prairie which had only recently been turned into suburbs, where houses and gardens and children were all growing up, it was hard to imagine that anything bad could happen. Indeed, I felt that the fact that so few Americans had been seriously touched by war (in spite of the great many who have filtered in one way or another through the Armed Services) was one of the sources of danger for the country today, because people were insufficiently afraid of war, and hence, more willing to be complacent about a belligerent foreign policy than if they had had the experiences that would lead them to a saner fear.

Recent surveys, as I read them, would seem to indicate that these complacencies have been only slightly touched either by the recession or by Sputnik. As to the former, the surveys conducted by Professor George Katona at The Survey Research Center for the Federal Reserve Board show that the unemployed are, on the whole, quite confident that they will get jobs soon. Consumers are far from panicky.¹ Likewise, even immediately after Sputnik, and especially after Explorer had been fired, large groups of the population accepted readily enough the Administration's idea that America could launch the same equipment into space if we really wanted to.² It is hard for people like ourselves in the upper-middle class, people like those of us reading *Shenandoah*, and our friends and colleagues, to imagine the extent of people's willingness to forget, to fail to perceive, to distort and to overlook what all mass media seems so urgently to say—and even what events seem to say.

In fact, if we examine the average person's information on foreign affairs, we will find, as Erich Fromm pointed out in *Escape*

¹Compare Katona, "The Psychology of the Recession," paper presented at September meetings of the American Psychological Association, Washington, D. C.

²Compare Donald N. Michael, "American Responses to Sputnik," paper delivered at the 1958 meetings of the American Psychological Association. I am indebted to Mr. Michael for many helpful suggestions concerning matters discussed in this paper.

from *Freedom*, that it is an entirely fragmented sort of information. It is of a newsreel quality, snippets without context. People "forget" items of information which would seem vital to those of us at this Conference—for example, at the very height of the uproar over McCarthy, polls showed that as many as a quarter of the respondents didn't know who he was; similarly, a good many people today could not name the Secretary of State, let alone say where Formosa is. People of limited education (but not necessarily limited intelligence) seldom have a framework in which to locate data which do not appear directly relevant.³ Nor are people excluded from sociability because of their incompetence or inattention on these fronts.⁴ Hence, while the mass media are apparently omnipresent with "news of the day," these programs are far from omnipotent—or perhaps, to put it another way, their powers to distract are far greater than their powers to attract.⁵

Almost without exception, campaigners who ask the electorate for votes have come to similar conclusions. Thus, Stimson Bullitt

³Even direct relevance, however, does not always suffice. Thus, a study in Detroit showed that many working-class people were unfamiliar with Social Security benefits of immediate concern to them—though less unfamiliar than in the case of other local agencies whose operations were still more remote. See Morris Janowitz, Deil Wright, and William Delaney, *Public Administration and the Public—Perspectives toward Government in a Metropolitan Community* (Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1958).

⁴In contrast, in some educated strata keeping up with the news is required for the inside-dopester. Cf. Riesman and Nathan Glazer, "Criteria for Political Apathy," in Alvin W. Gouldner, ed., *Studies in Leadership* (New York: Harper's, 1950).

⁵In the course of the Conference there was some discussion of the technology of polling and other methods for measuring popular attitudes and levels of information. Certainly there are many problems of technique and judgment which are involved in interpreting the responses one gets through polls. In taking account of poll data, however, I have sought to allow for these zones of unreliability and possible distortion and to put the poll data with which I am familiar together with other data obtained in other ways. I think it undeniable that different stations and experiences of life give people different preoccupations as well as occupations, and that all recent research warns against assuming too readily that other people respond to the media or to events as we ourselves do. Cf., e.g., B. Fisher and G. Belknap, *America's Role in World Affairs* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Survey Research Center, 1952), pp. 42-43.

in his forthcoming book, *To Be a Politician*, describes how he tried to interest the voters of Seattle in what to a fighting liberal appeared vital issues of foreign and domestic policy, only to discover that he was never asked about them when out campaigning. Likewise, Lewis Dexter, who has managed the congressional campaigns of a number of people, informs me that most voters do not know the position of their candidate on even such hotly debated and locally important issues as the tariff, let alone on matters involving more remote issues. Issues appear to be an offshoot of personality in the sense that people assume that politicians who seem to be good guys (and often not so very different from themselves) will of course vote "right" on anything that matters—and people will in fact assume that their officials did in fact vote right even in the face of newspaper evidence to the contrary.⁶

If this is so, then one must ask why congressmen or any elected officials try to get on what they consider the popular side of an issue. I would contend that it is seldom because they realistically fear retaliation. At most, they fear that some vocal minority will make a nuisance of itself over the issue, with the consequence that their stand might alienate influential precinct workers or financial backers (whose help one of course needs in reaching the voters with one's personality and in getting them to the polls). But I think it is more important to see that the leaders, though considerably less complacent than their constituencies, nevertheless resemble them in fundamental perceptions, in lack of willingness to face alternatives, and in a basic optimism. At times, moreover, they are themselves deceived, as the Alsops were deceived, by the feedback from their own pronouncements and those of other issue-makers. If, living on the plains of the Midwest it is hard to imagine that there is such a thing as Europe (and sometimes one wants to forget that one's ancestors came all too recently from there), so living in

⁶For a general discussion of the way voters distort the stand of their own candidate on issues, compare Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); and, for a sagacious treatment of the problem of differential exposure to information in a democracy, see Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, *Competitive Pressure and Democratic Consent* (Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1956).

Washington one may overestimate the extent of people's concern with the headlines, and underestimate the enormous apathy which acts as a shield or buffer against information and, for the most part, against anxiety. Thus, it is possible for a Washington official to assume that people read editorials or listen to commentators, and that this or that policy is politically "impossible" because Senator Knowland or Senator Bridges might make a speech denouncing it. In fact, it may be more comforting for one's faith in democracy and popular government to believe that people care and are misinformed, than to realize how little they care and how little sense of responsibility they have learned to have beyond the suburb or beyond the township.⁷

In fact, public opinion research in recent years has done little to comfort those who believe that if only one can reach the people one will get true and decent answers to exigent questions, that the people, the working people, are basically liberal, while only their exploiters, the bosses, the elite and the upper classes, are reactionary. This is true only if we define as liberalism: favoring welfare state measures and, in general, government intervention in the economy. It is definitely not true if we are thinking of civil liberties or internationalism—or, indeed, that form of internationalism within the United States which is sympathetic to Negroes and other ethnic minorities. Every public opinion poll for the last 20 years, that I've seen, shows that education makes a decisive difference in this sort of liberalism, that people who have been to college tend to believe in free trade in goods and other ideas, while people who have been only to grammar school do not, and people who have been through high school are in between.⁸

How then are we to explain the fact that the Democrats, the party which the working class and the underprivileged have tended

⁷For discussion of the distinction between political concern with such matters as foreign affairs and civic concern with suburban or town government or schools, compare my article "The Suburban Sadness," in William Dobriner, ed., *The Suburban Community* (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1958).

⁸See for fuller consideration Samuel Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (New York: Doubleday, 1955), and my discussion in "Interviewers, Elites, and Orbits of Tolerance," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 20 (1956), pp. 49-73.

to favor, have also been the party, in many instances, of liberalism in international affairs? We come here to the fact that the Democratic Party has intermittently been a party of more or less intellectual and enlightened leaders whose acceptance of both economic and political liberalism enabled them to capture working-class and ethnic-minority votes.⁹ Thus, though the working class are, in general, against all forms of foreign aid, they will not unseat a Walter Reuther, who favors it, provided he brings home the economic bacon.

Our whole society is set up in terms of interest blocs in such a way that voters and members of the blocs are encouraged to think of themselves in bloc terms, and only very rarely are they encouraged by leadership and education to transcend these interests. Working-class life in this country is not conducive, on the whole, to wide political horizons. Those who have such horizons or seek them are likely to be filtered off into middle-class positions. In turn, these positions may or may not provide the basis for an interest in foreign affairs; often, the very effort to achieve a higher class station can lead to insensitivity to the less obvious requirements of that station, such as a concern for the political future—and, conversely, those whose social-class position is falling (as Richard Hofstadter has emphasized in his writings) are frequently attracted by the “radical right” and its xenophobia.

Given these conditions, it may not always be wise to try to bring into the political arena on foreign policy those strata which are presently apathetic. For example, should one seek to reach the politically uninvolved with a campaign against nuclear fallout, this might have boomerang consequences: far from building a “mass base” for a less precarious foreign policy, the result might be to create such impatience with the Communist enemy and with the unstructured and hence unendurable world situation as to enhance sentiment for an end to ambiguity even at the risk of a “preventive,” suicidal war.¹⁰

⁹The discussion here is based largely on the work of Professor Seymour M. Lipset. See, among other things, his contribution to Daniel Bell (ed.), *The New American Right* (New York: Criterion Books, 1955).

¹⁰Although conclusive evidence is lacking, it would appear that get-out-the-

The battles over foreign policy are conducted between relatively small minorities, elites if you please, which seek continuously to find mass support for their positions, in order to defeat the competition and to give themselves a sense of legitimacy. One such minority is world-minded and fundamentally cosmopolitan, and it is growing apace as more and more Americans travel abroad (and actually "see" other countries rather than the sights they are supposed to take snapshots of); young people in college are less and less given to old-fashioned American chauvinism (outside of some denominational colleges, especially in the South). Another minority is geopolitically but not psychologically global, and for its policies of many missile bases and world bipolarization it is driven to seek backing from the great majority of provincial and ethnocentric Americans—the latter are brought into the conduct of foreign affairs in a peripheral way, for example, to swell the three to one majority of those who are against recognizing Red China or permitting trade with the Communist bloc.¹¹ Thus, while on the one hand America is, of course, more and more linked to the fate of the whole planet, and while more and more Americans are aware of this, the concomitant growth of a mass plebiscitary "vote" in foreign policy (a vote guided, of course, by a competing elite) jeopardizes this very advance. Moreover, the very tolerance of the world-minded, which makes them less ethnocentric abroad, weakens them at home, making them vulnerable to the bigotry of the less educated and less privileged and, at times, out of fear of

vote campaigns swelled the Eisenhower majorities in 1952 and 1956 with voters who, basically apathetic, responded only to personalities and not to issues; many would consider themselves as Democrats, though without interest or great conviction. Cf. Louis Harris, *Is there a Republican Majority?* (New York: Harper's 1954); and Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Rowe Peterson, 1954). Bringing sleepwalkers to the polls simply to increase turnout is no service to democracy.

¹¹In the course of discussion at the Conference, I pointed out that at this stage in history Red China might not want recognition as much as it wants the psychological-warfare fruits of non-recognition: no matter what the United States does or does not do, Chinese Communist policy may not alter. But my theme at the meeting was not what might practically be done by a more flexible American foreign policy—the situation may in fact be beyond repair—but rather what were some of the domestic roots of the American position in world affairs.

alienation from the latter, susceptible not only to being governed by their votes, inescapable in a democracy, but also to being swayed by their views when these have been mobilized and sloganized, as occurs in a war or a Cold War.

The cosmopolitan groups are more or less continuously accessible to information on foreign affairs; the mass publics are isolationist in the sense of being only periodically accessible. In addition, there is a congeries of publics whose intermittent concern with foreign affairs arises from their ethnic origins, as they are reminded of these by politicians prospecting for votes, clergymen for parishes, fund raisers for dollars—and often these constituencies seek their own reminders (as Oscar Handlin and others have shown) as a way of identifying themselves psychologically and culturally on the American scene. At the moment, several of these ethnic blocs are very important indeed: I think of the Zionists and the Irish, and perhaps also the Germans and Poles. Members of these blocs can be mobilized into vociferous pressure groups to prevent peaceable adjustment of remaining European or Middle Eastern boundaries which might be causes of war. The Protestant majority doesn't care to tangle with either.

Let me turn now, however, away from each of these groups, even the first of which is large enough to constitute a "mass," and dwell on some of the special publics which are crucial in the area of foreign affairs and are far more likely to be reached by members of such a group as this. That is, I want to return to the perspective on public opinion illustrated by my story about the committee of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Precisely because of the large scale and seemingly monolithic quality of the mass publics, it is important not to neglect those crucial groups which may, most of the time, be powerless, but which may at other times reveal untapped energies. Some of these groups have more knowledge than power, and others more power than knowledge, although in general, of course, people who lack power tend also not to acquire knowledge, and people who have knowledge tend to acquire power (also, unfortunately, people who have power may, by the same token, deprive themselves of knowledge or deprive knowledgeable people of access to them).

The first such group I want to discuss are the scientists and staff men now working for the government or on government contracts. Some of the atomic scientists among them feel that they have lived in the awareness of disaster since Hiroshima and that nobody cares. The lack of a lay audience which understands their concerns, if not all the details of their technology, makes them feel isolated and sometimes reduces them to apathy. The fact that liberals and social scientists have, on the whole, not concerned themselves with military affairs has increased the divorce of morality and knowledge and has made the morality of many civilian commentators on science and on military policy unrealistic—certainly few civilians recognize the differences among the military services, or the nature of their links to the civilian economy on the one side, and civilian politics on the other. The scientists who are thus divorced from a lay audience outside the government often feel equally isolated within government or the Armed Services, viewing their military or civilian superiors as hopelessly out of date and as still fighting the last war or the war before that one. (Perhaps a good example of this is the fact that General Gavin, although far more alert to what is going on in the world than many of his former colleagues, is caught in the wild "realism" of recommending mobile missile bases, and paratroops and sky-cavalry for atomic battlefields, even while demonstrating that the manned plane is obsolete and that, after a nuclear show-down between the super-powers, the latter may no longer be in charge of what is left of the planet.) In an atmosphere where they must choose between moral preachment divorced from factuality on the one side, and technical discourse divorced from morality on the other, members of this cadre of scientists often are inclined to feel "what's the use: the world is going to blow up anyway so we might as well get our paychecks and do our perhaps creative technical work." The work of the Federation of American Scientists and of the supporters of and contributors to *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* shows, *inter alia*, how vital the concern of the scientific community remains. Even so, it would be a mistake to believe that most scientists share this concern, and the relatively small readership of the *Bulletin* inside as well as outside

the scientific community may be taken as an index of current amnesias even among people in academic and research activities.¹²

And this brings me to the second small but potentially influential group I want to discuss, namely, academic people other than the scientists directly involved in the moral and practical issues of weapons systems and technology. There are obviously great differences from campus to campus and among the different disciplines, but it is my impression that there is far less avid interest in world affairs in the academic community today than in earlier decades, and that such interest as there is exists more intensely among the older than among the younger faculty members. Thus, when I reentered academic life in 1946, there was much spirited discussion in leading institutions concerning the Acheson-Lillienthal (Baruch) plan for the control of atomic energy. In contrast, today I have the feeling that a kind of fallout has occurred, blanketing analogous discussion—of the Pugwash Conferences, for example. If I am correct, and not simply reflecting the bias of necessarily limited experience, then we have to ask whether, as some contend, this is the result of McCarthyism and the fear of being compromised by involvement in unpopular positions. I am inclined to think that such direct fears are only a very small part of the story. To some degree, professors remain in some universities afraid of being gulled by Communist propaganda, less because this might get them into trouble than because they fear to think of themselves, or be thought of, as soft and naive; thinking about the possibilities for a world of peace is equated with wishful thinking, and both are more deprecated than not thinking. (While educated people have learned from Freud that it is bad to repress many sorts of previously condemned fantasy, this attitude has not extended its charity to political fantasy!) There is great reluctance among the educated to become alienated from the country at large, not with respect to attitudes towards tail fins, television, or the *Readers Digest*, but with respect to those atti-

¹²On the importance of the scientists in the decision to drop the first atomic bomb, see Joan Moore and Burton M. Moore, "The Role of the Scientific Elite in the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," *Social Problems*, vol. 6 (1958), pp. 78-85.

tudes of unreflecting patriotism that bespeak the tough, masculine, no-nonsense American.

Moreover, as we all know, academic people have been absorbed into specialist institutes manned by people who feel they have risen above lib-lab clichés. Even so, these people have been greatly touched by the race issue, by Little Rock, or by the issue of segregation in their own communities. Here the issues are immediate and sometimes involve their own behavior or that of their institution. But foreign policy has become almost as remote for many intellectuals and academics as for the country as a whole. I was struck by this when I went, at the American Psychological Association meetings earlier this month, to a session on war and peace. A handful of people showed up, whereas hundreds turned up to hear a psychoanalytic discussion of dreams and other hundreds for a discussion of technical methodology. Partly what is lacking in academia today is realization of how interesting are the problems of foreign policy. The situation in Poland, for instance, or in West Africa, hardly ever gets discussed as something intellectually exciting. Many academic people lack historical perspective and faith in a possible future for mankind which might give meaning to the daily diet of crises and problems; hence politics becomes only ominous, important, opaque, and incurable, and the retreat into private life has little competition.

Another specialist audience is that of the journalists and broadcasters. And I am thinking of them now not in terms of their role as transmitters but in their own terms as intellectuals or demi-intellectuals. That is, I am thinking of their impact not on their mass audiences but on their friends in the elite—though, no doubt, if they learned to hold more differentiated views some of this would leak out in what they say and write.¹³

¹³Indeed, what they presently say and write in the major media, including the *New York Times* and the typical news broadcast, is at such a low level of understanding and (with notable exceptions) high level of ethnocentrism as only to confirm the preference of many intellectuals for matters of culture over matters of state. The "well-informed" person has to filter out much "noise" in the channels of mass communication to discover what is really happening in the world—and it is not surprising that he often concludes that life is too short for that. We seem to have lost the band of romantic roving foreign

I can only mention here several other publics of the same sort, including the more intelligent military men, the leaders of voluntary associations such as The League of Women Voters, of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and the great conservative groups of ministers who can't be reached by secular media, but could be reached through the channels of their own churches and, perhaps, from abroad through Italian or Belgian or German sources when they are Catholics or Lutherans.¹⁴

The defeats for democracy in recent years have led many liberals to move from hopefulness about public opinion to complete despair. The more they learn—sometimes including the more social science—the less they feel they can influence events. It is frequently assumed that only the military and high civilian officials have effective power—a view which cannot account for the influence of Edward Teller on American defense policy (or the more recent influence of Killian or Bethe). Overgeneralizations are made about the “military mind,” and the hopelessness of reaching it with ideas which might be tagged as pacifist or lacking in warlike ardor. Actually, a more differentiated view is necessary. Thus, one can find military men who, precisely because they know the cost of war and do not need to prove themselves virile, can take a more detached view of the present situation than many civilians dare to take. Likewise, one could too readily assume that “the” Catholic Church is anti-Communist to the point of war whereas, in fact, there are many groups and orders within the Church here and abroad, of different ethnic origins, and of different degrees of detachment and bellicosity. Similarly, there are important businessmen, extremely conservative not to say reactionary in the field of

correspondents who brought enthusiasm if not always good judgment to reporting between the two World Wars, and to have got instead more careful but less passionate and interesting “organization men” who accept handouts both from foreign governments and from the going “American” line.

¹⁴There is also the opportunity to work for less monolithic views among the many Hungarian and Polish refugee groups now so uncompromisingly anti-Soviet as to be willing to risk nuclear war to bring down Communist control of the satellite countries. But among the refugees are some who realize that neither the Poles nor the Hungarians in their homelands would take these same risks, but prefer to fight the regime in a more “tactical” if less dramatic fashion.

domestic policy, who have suddenly become aware of the terrifying destructive power of modern weapons and who, not for the sake of budgets but for the sake of life itself (or in order to save the Republican Party), have been looking for other alternatives to our current foreign policy—and sometimes discovering that the stockpile of ideas to be found in the academic community is not very great.

Henry Kissinger's ideas of limited war should be understood as, *inter alia*, an effort to provide alternatives to unlimited destructiveness: Kissinger proposes a sort of containment policy for total military madness. He is one of the few intellectuals who has sought to confront the problems faced by the Services—and, to some extent, his work has appealed to officers eager to save a mission for their arm of the Service without entering the alluring competition for a total nuclear panoply of weapons systems. (In my judgment, Kissinger's thinking fails to take adequate account of the fact that America, being the sort of country it is, is unlikely to fight a limited war, especially after the Korean experience, because it takes so much to arouse people who then become overaroused.)¹⁵

Furthermore, ideas to be effective in world affairs need not be taken up by leaders in this country provided they are persuasive to leaders in some other countries. The fact, for instance, that Britain has had much more animated debate on foreign policy than this country has had, may have saved us before now from our own errors. The British, perhaps because they suffered through the last war, do not need to establish their own self-image of toughness by being ferociously anti-Communist. The impact of George Keenan's imaginative BBC Third Programme Reith Lectures on British and Continental educated opinion is a striking and heartening example.

Moreover, affairs may well get to such a pass in this country that someone like Churchill in England before the Second World

¹⁵I refer both to Kissinger's *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Doubleday Anchor edition, 1958), and to his recent articles in *Foreign Affairs*, especially "Nuclear Testing and the Problem of Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 37 (October 1958), pp. 1-18. Cf., also, Lewis Dexter, "The Policy Sciences and Limited Warfare," *PROD*, vol. 1 (July 1958), pp. 17-19.

War, who is clearly realistic, clearly right, and clearly unpopular, may have a chance. I would think that this would, at present, have to be outside the two major parties, but within the smaller circles of leadership I have been describing.

In thinking about a problem like this it always helps to look at it not only from one's own point of view, but from that of the "other." Americans are accustomed to doing this in domestic affairs, but much less so in foreign affairs; thus, we tend not to do this vis-à-vis the Russians or Chinese, but to see the world (if we look at it at all) in terms of the ethnocentric maps in most of our journals. Even liberals seldom look at the world so broadly. Few liberals make the effort to understand the outlook of the "other" when the latter takes the form, for example, of a body as remote from most domestic debate as the Strategic Air Command. Let us here, however, make the experiment of thought that the military would term a "war game," and try to look at matters as the S.A.C. does. The S.A.C. is one of the few organizations in this country which is not complacent. It is led by a dedicated group who take their mission seriously and believe in it. For them, also, the apathy of the American public constitutes a problem. They fear and have feared that the day will come when not enough money will be voted or enough men recruited for the country's defense. Many of them feel about the public the way the French paratroopers feel in Algeria about the civilian French colonists: that they are protecting the all too comfortable, who are giving them no credit for it, and even competing with them for the necessary sinews of war. They must struggle even with many of their own group who cannot help wanting to return, from the arduous and anxiety-provoking practice missions of the S.A.C., to the familiar world of civilian life. The S.A.C. officers too, feel that the public does not respond to information, and that in the competition of the public with the private purse, the private purse has hegemony.¹⁰ Indeed, some of their very strength has come from appealing to the cheapness of atomic weapons and thus strengthening this same budget-mindedness and lack of large perspectives.

¹⁰See the brilliant discussion of this in John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958).

It must be tempting to this group, to move people by arguments in which they themselves do not really believe in order to achieve ends in which they do believe. And since it is hard to move Americans by arguments, whether good or bad, there is always the terrible temptation to move them by events—as Pearl Harbor moved them. Samuel Lubell, after taking the pulse of public opinion immediately following Sputnik, concluded that it was impossible to influence people by political arguments, that these simply did not get through, and that the only way to reach them was to manipulate the whole economy, because they did respond to paychecks, to unemployment, to inflation.¹⁷ It seems to me that one of our real dangers today is that the apathy of the public, its lack of response, tempts people to despairing courses of action which are eventually self-defeating. To put this another way: the noncomplacent minorities, whether pacifists or officers of the Strategic Air Command, may be driven to impatience and to bad judgment by the lack of a larger audience which understands the issues between them.

As indicated, I have misgivings about looking for that audience in the amorphous public at large. Even in a utopian society people would be differentially interested in foreign affairs, and even at moments of great crisis and danger not everyone would be mobilized—in fact, total mobilization is more characteristic of totalitarian societies than of traditional ones, whether aristocratic or democratic (I should qualify this, however, by adding that in World War II the Nazis mobilized the whole economy less effectively than the Americans or the British). Eventually, one would hope more people might respond to foreign affairs out of self-interest and the wish to survive and the wish for a better world, and out of curiosity and disinterested motives as well. But a society in which this were so would be very different from ours, and the more imperative need today (if we are to live long enough to imagine such a utopian society, let alone to create one) is for ideas and for small audiences for them—ideas which are not immediately

¹⁷See Lubell, "Sputnik and American Public Opinion," *Columbia University Forum*, vol. 1 (fall, 1957), pp. 15-21.

cut short or truncated by the need to make them appealing to a mass audience or capable of being publicized through a sort of William Allen White Committee network. That is, we must have the courage to experiment with ideas among ourselves and within each of us—ideas which cannot be immediately sloganized or sold. Only the most trivial inventions are ordinarily created for a waiting market.

Yet, at the same time, to live as some S.A.C. pilots have done with the knowledge that if war came they would have a one-way ticket to the Soviet Union in planes which could not make the round trip, requires an enormous dedication akin to that of the pasifists of the "Golden Rule." Such dedication is compatible with personal sanity in part because it is shared, whereas individuals having to face in utter isolation the mass apathy of American life might easily go crazy.

But, of course, hardly anyone does live in total isolation. We live among our families, among our friends, among our coworkers, and the experience of Hungary and Poland shows how hard it is even for the most vicious totalitarian power to disrupt completely these primary groups, and the support for dissent (or, in the Communist countries, simply disinterest) they can provide. To some degree, a similar phenomenon operates in this country vis à-vis the apparent power of the mass media. Recent studies have shown that people in general do not respond directly to advertising or to propaganda; indeed, their distrust for these makes them all the more dependent on personal influence, on the opinions of their friends and families. But one or more of the latter—the so-called "opinion leaders"—may themselves be less immune to vicarious influence and, attentive to the messages of the media, can retail them as their own views to their friends and associates.¹⁸ Much, in fact, that appears as apathy is a distrust of remote influences which are not supported in the web of kinship and friendship. If one wants to reach people at large, one can almost never do it by leaflets.

¹⁸See, in general, Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955).

But at the same time, leaflets and other such media can support people who are themselves engaged in reaching other people, can support them with arguments, with a sense of mission, with a sense they they do not work alone and unrecognized. (The leaflets the pertinacious Jehovah's Witnesses hand out convince few people and irritate many—but they do keep the Witnesses themselves in the fold.) When supported in this way, it is often extraordinary what a single person can do who is intelligent and energetic, within his own circle. And while people, when lacking faith and being confused and suspicious, will respond to "sincere" fanatics whose very conviction is appealing, it is also possible that they will respond to people who can make sense of their world, who can make it interesting and meaningful. One of the things which is important about engendering a genuine debate on foreign policy, if only among a few people, is that it may increase the general vitality and aliveness of these people.

Now to sum up. Against the spread of enlightened ideas of whatever sort there are the traditional barriers of apathy and distrust. Liberals in this country could previously act with a certain sureness because they were innocent of the extent of the bigotry of working-class folk, and could blame what they found on a few bad war-mongers, or a power elite. Social science has helped increase the liberal's sense of hopelessness at the very moment in history when the liberal cause lost momentum because of the war or because of the linkage with Communism, and because of the achievement of many domestic goals.¹⁰ Thus, new barriers have been discovered. One of them is an enemy that doesn't fight back, a lack of debate. Another is the fear of idealism which is so strong that even a great idealist like George Kennan argues about the dangers of idealism as if we were still living in a Wilsonian period. It is now, moreover, that we are aware of the strength of irrational

¹⁰This is, of course, a great oversimplification and some necessary qualifications were brought out in the discussions at the Conference. It is, of course, true that the issues today are less clear cut than they seemed to be in earlier generations, and that the social class hegemony of the Eastern seaboard groups has been weakened, and along with this, the feeling that the country is manageable from any point within it has been weakened, quite apart from the intractability of many developments in the world as a whole.

forces in man, and are sometimes tempted to appeal to these forces when, for instance, we try to scare people into wisdom only to discover, in many cases, that they lack the imagination to be frightened.

Let me close with another story. In May I was asked to talk to a group of selected students at a leading university. It was the last lecture of the year and my academic hosts asked me to talk about something I thought important. I had advised them that I would talk about some developments in social science, but instead I decided at the last minute to talk about the world situation and the dangers which threaten mankind. I explained, for instance, why I had been a signatory of the Committee on a Sane Nuclear Policy. When time came for discussion I was attacked by a number of students who said, "Would I rather live on my knees than die on my feet?" This slogan came up like a blow again and again. (It turned out that a number of these students were readers of *The National Review*.) These students thought themselves non-conformist and independent because they were willing to die in the battle against what we could all agree was Communist terror and oppression. But they were quite unaware of the extent of their own oppression which had led them to accept a current ethnocentric slogan without critical examination. I was reminded of the American pilots who during the last war demolished German and Japanese cities without afterthought because it was a clean job, and because they risked their own lives in doing so (a few, of course, did have afterthoughts as did a few civilians). It occurred to me that no group of women in a comparable women's college could talk this way and treat life with such contempt—even life under the most terrible and apparently irretrievable conditions: if women thought on these matters as men traditionally have, the human race would long ago have perished. I felt that these boys were trying to be manly but were afraid to confess a reasonable fear—and I realized that for the first time in history men have the power not only to destroy themselves, but all women as well, and all life.

But fortunately not all students felt as the more vocal of this group did. There were other students there (also to be met with

at other institutions) who were critical of the Committee on a Sane Nuclear Policy because they felt its efforts did not go far enough, dealing only with the symptoms of testing and not with the diseases of foreign policy and nationalism itself. These latter students were a small minority. I got the impression, however, that they had not previously been aware that any considerable number of fellow-students, not to speak of a visiting social scientist, shared and could carry forward their own private concerns. They had suffered, I suspect, from what sociologists term "pluralistic ignorance"—believing that "everyone" shared the viewpoint of the articulate minority, and they were even more isolated, confused, and self-deprecatory than was actually warranted. Correspondingly, other students, part of the previously great unconcerned majority, were in some cases required to stop, look, and listen on discovering that people they respected found questions of survival worth discussing seriously. There is, it goes without saying, no guarantee that self-clarification in the minds of a few can save us. But I believe it is worth engaging in on its own account, and there is always the chance, as infinitesimal in the beginning as a genetic mutation, that it may be of practical help.



To a Typewriter

Here on a glass top desk there sits
An instrument to wield creation
And at the desk there sits and spits
Out words upon this fiend a patient one
No longer patient, and no creation
Worth the effort yields this union
Of idle mind, machine, and inclination.

SHIRLEY GIBSON

John Verdery

Love's License

I love, I say, a woman.
I look into her eyes
And see myself.
Her tender hand on mine,
I feel myself;
A gentle tear upon her cheek,
I love, I say a woman.

I love, I say my God,
The my the most.
I lift up mine eyes unto the hills,
Whence cometh my help.
My help cometh even from the Lord.
Even my help
Cometh from the Lord.
I love, I say, my God.

There is no love
Except the love of self,
And so no love at all, no hope
Except that God Himself
Loves Himself, part of Whom is I.
So I am loved,
And loved, licensed to love,
And do.

BOOK REVIEWS

AMERICAN STUDIES IN EUROPE: THEIR HISTORY AND PRESENT ORGANIZATION. By *Sigmund Skard*. Two volumes. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958.

More than five years ago, Professor Skard, director of the American Institute at Oslo, took on the formidable task of describing the history, development, vicissitudes and present status of American Studies in no fewer than thirty-one countries. Now he has emerged not with a mere list, not with a superficial survey, but with an authoritative document of importance not only to his controversial subject, but also to the history of education in modern Europe. While focussing his attention upon things American, Skard confronts with courage other problems, both central and peripheral, in which his subject by its nature is embedded: problems of school and university reform, of faculty organization, of the varying relationships between educational systems and society. That he does so with taste, tact, and objectivity leavened by enlightened criticism is a tribute to his mastery of an oppressive amount of data and witness to an enthusiasm that did not flag over the years required for the preparation of the manuscript.

Written by a European for Europeans, the book is nevertheless a godsend for anyone engaged in comparative American study, for it reconstructs much historical matter that was nebulous, while along the way it confirms that the study of America in Europe is neither a luxury nor an activity engaged in at the insistence of occupation authorities or opportunistic politicians, but an intellectual challenge that was perceived as early as the eighteenth century in the more enlightened European centers. At Göttingen, for example, between 1777 and 1797, three learned journals were devoted exclusively to American events. A high percentage of the mass of the two volumes consists of lists of curricula and scholars. This is useful, but more important, the comparisons that emerge, both explicit and implicit, should serve to scourge those complacent European institutions where a lecturer, an occasional Fulbright scholar, and a reference to Melville by the Professor of English are presumed to satisfy all need for attention to the Ameri-

can area. That is to say, Skard removes American Studies in Europe from the defensive and places the burden of defence upon the adherents of certain traditional but suspect attitudes where America is concerned.

Where Skard falters, and he does occasionally falter, is in terminology and method. The use in the title of "American Studies" may be misleading, since what Skard describes is any study, excluding the Natural Sciences, that involves American material, rather than the inter-disciplinary approach which by common consent the term has come to mean. Although Skard cites the fact that *sui generis* American Studies requires the inter-departmental approach, he needed to emphasize that fact more fully, particularly for most continental readers, since in the majority of continental universities interdepartmental work is distasteful and utterly foreign to their practice. Further, Skard's method of presenting masses of material tends to create abstraction, and more dangerously, to inflate the value of what has been done, even though he warns repeatedly against such inflation. Although Skard salts his material with varied professional comment, he relies upon printed catalogues, and regrettably he omits comment from students themselves.

These criticisms should not obscure the fact that this book is an achievement, and that not only scholars in the American field but scholars in widely disparate areas may be grateful for Skard's labors. One can only hope that the book will be read by University administrators, in the U. S. as in Europe; if we are blessed, it may create the atmosphere for reforms long overdue.

JOHN O. MCCORMICK

THE AMERICAN EARTHQUAKE, by *Edmund Wilson*, Doubleday Anchor Books. \$6.00.

Mr. Edmund Wilson's latest volume is subtitled *A Documentary of the Twenties and Thirties*. Vague as the phrase is, it would be difficult to invent one more genuinely descriptive; for the book is a compilation of Wilson's fugitive pieces, excluding his literary

criticism, written between 1920 and 1940. These are chiefly concerned with politics, the theater, and the interrelation of social forms and economic practice. They convey in large measure the sense of the felt life of the period, and they will undoubtedly prove invaluable to subsequent historians.

The book is a curious one and will surprise, please, and, upon occasion, disappoint Mr. Wilson's many admirers. The greater number of these essays are taken from the *New Republic* in its palmier days. We are surprised at the "literary" quality of that distinguished magazine and of the younger Edmund Wilson. I do not mean my adjective "literary" to be altogether complimentary. Quite simply, a number of these pieces are overwritten; and one is accustomed to a more dispassionate style from Mr. Wilson, even when writing social, political, and theatrical criticism. Proust and Marx combined make for strange discourse. I suspect that Mr. Wilson felt this himself, for he says in his preface that many of these pieces have been rewritten for publication in book form.

Yet the fault is at worst a small one, and it infects only the extremities, not the heart of the book. The value of *The American Earthquake* as a documentary (which is all that it pretends to be) is enormous. Its obviously liberal bias is a further advantage; it does not suffer from the lack of a point of view characteristic of its author and appropriate to its subject. If one would understand the Twenties and Thirties in America, this book is an ideal introduction, largely because of the particularity and even impermanence of its subject matter. It is, after all, interesting and in a way important to know what Aimee Semple McPherson wore or how Mrs. Judd died in the electric chair.

RANDOLPH M. BULGIN



R. H. Walker

AMERICAN STUDIES—AN ACADEMIC VIEW

Even a quick survey of the extent of American civilization courses and programs in our colleges, of the way in which these offerings are organized, and of the types of materials from which classroom knowledge emerges, reveals a great deal about the academician's view of his civilization. That is what this essay will undertake.¹

Colleges sponsoring courses or programs in American civilization are still very much in the minority, although the growth in this area indicates a radically increasing interest in the field. Of the ninety-two institutions which recently reported a starting date for their offerings, only one claimed origins prior to the first World War; two were established in the '20s; ten in the '30s; thirty-six in the '40s. The '50s, by 1957, had already seen the beginnings of forty-three new offerings. Such a remarkable rate of increase in some ways provides the academic answer to the question, "Is America a Civilization?" More and more academics are assuming (at least for the purposes of courses and programs) that there is such a phenomenon, and that it merits serious attention in classroom and curriculum.

This growth has resulted from multiple causes. American attitudes, both inside and outside the academic world, have shown a questioning turn throughout the current century. Reassessments of American values begun by the Progressives have been continued by the cultural "exiles" of the '20s; by the generation of Depression-shocked writers and thinkers; and by the contemporary spokesman for the "beat" decade. The ideologies we came publically to

¹The data for this article are taken from a survey sponsored by the American Studies Association scheduled for fall publication by the Louisiana State University Press under the title, *American Studies in the United States*.

stand for during and after the two World Wars have further contributed to the process of self-examination. We have wished to prove, both to ourselves and others, that America means something more than the bomb and the dollar.

Meanwhile, the plastered side of the ivy-covered wall has seen a reaction to the special compartmentation of knowledge fostered by the nineteenth century. Simultaneously there has appeared a willingness to admit into the curriculum, after an overlong period of colonial-mindedness, materials representative of American conditions and achievements. The seemingly forgotten assumption that a college is a place not only to compile and disseminate, but to *relate* knowledge has been taken more seriously. Consequently programs in general education, in area studies, and within existing departments have provided the necessary framework for so broad a project as the study of American civilization.

The existence of this activity demonstrates the presence of a need to understand our society. How is this study being undertaken? What sort of understanding is it producing? In considering answers to these questions one must bear in mind the rather rigid departmental structure which characterizes most colleges and universities; this condition, plus other organizational fixtures such as grades, major-minor requirements, transfer credit, teaching loads, etc., has shaped and in some ways confined the development of these interdepartmental ventures. The urge to combine into one program the study of more than one aspect of American civilization began, typically, within the confines of a single department—usually the department of history or literature. By securing the cooperation of one or more “related” departments (or simply by suggesting course offerings outside the original department to the student), the sponsoring department could then encourage the development of a curriculum focusing, let us say, on American letters, but including a consideration of American history and government as well. At this point an assumption seems to have been made which assured—and to some extent still does—the principle of growth by addition.

If courses from two fields were “good” (for the study of a civilization), the study of courses from three fields would be “better.”

Following this assumption, courses and materials were added to the student's experience from philosophy, religion, the fine arts, political science, economics, and so on throughout the humanities and some of the social sciences. Where this principle is in force, students may justifiably infer that one learns about a culture by surrounding it, by being able to see it not only from impressions gleaned by its painters and poets, but also from institutions created and described by its statesmen and public-minded citizens, from formal philosophies stated by its thinkers, and so forth. In the end, the student may be left in a position very similar to that of some social historians—*i.e.*, with a great wealth of material but with no developmental theme to explain it and no ready-made compartments into which to organize it. To be sure, no student is expected to participate in a study of his civilization from all these viewpoints; nor is his varied experience left totally unassimilated. Special courses or tutorials are usually provided to exemplify the correlation of diverse knowledge as related to specific topics drawn from our history.

Regardless of counteractive measures, however, many formal programs in American civilization can best be described as subscribing to the "additive" approach. The inference to be drawn from this condition is an interesting one. Such permissive curricula, within which the student may draw his materials for the study of the civilization from such a wealth of sources, plainly imply that to every man must come his own picture of his civilization. With no overriding thesis or discipline imposed upon him, he may draw from whatever sources interest and attract him, he may organize as his experience dictates, and he will arrive inevitably at a composite heavily influenced by his own personality. Though in the process he may have chaos as his constant companion, his reward for success is delightfully fitting: an individualistic concept of a society whose traditions tell him that the supreme social value lies with the free individual.

Fearing the dangers of an unassimilable breadth of selection, many colleges have tightened their curricula by retaining, or returning to, the close sponsorship of one or two academic departments. Because of the relative scarcity of college teaching posi-

tions directly in the field of American civilization, this tendency is particularly noticeable in graduate programs where most of the students envisage teaching careers. As he did in early programs of this sort, the student here spends a great portion of his time pursuing traditional lines of departmental study, steeping himself in materials both native and foreign. His work in American civilization is thought of not so much as an end in itself, but as an enrichment of his principal objective—the study of a particular area of human achievement throughout the course of western civilization.

Obviously, the implications of such programs are not totally affirmative on the question of developing an important, integral, and largely self-sufficient concept of American civilization. No academician would deny the importance of our European roots; nor would he in any other way suggest that our society be studied in a vacuum. If, however, he is primarily interested in developing a concept of American civilization he might be inclined to quarrel with an approach which places such strong emphasis on backgrounds and which implies that data springing from our own culture can be organized only in terms dictated by conventional disciplines and tested principally by application to foreign materials. This type of approach may, in short, somewhat beg the question as to whether or not there is, as legitimate academic subject matter, an American civilization. Whether this question is avoided through conviction (or lack of conviction) or for the sake of expediency (facing the difficult placement problem for graduate students in American civilization) cannot be determined.

These two approaches represent the great majority of collegiate and graduate efforts to organize curricula leading toward the understanding of our society. Exposing the student to a large range of materials emanating from our civilization, they offer him—on the one hand—the opportunity to forge an individual concept of social facts and relationships or—on the other hand—suggest that he consider his country as primarily an extension of Europe, and organize his American materials along lines dictated by the study of European civilization. These approaches are typically dominated by departments of literature and history; they focus on the materi-

als of social, intellectual, and literary history and to a lesser extent government, economics, the fine arts, philosophy, and religion.

A third method of organizing materials dealing with American civilization represents a distinct departure. To date it has made itself felt in only a few courses rather than as a pattern for curricular requirements. Growing out of recent work in cultural anthropology and social psychology, this approach (usually designated as the "culture concept" of civilization) dictates an organization of data which is scientific rather than humanistic in conception. Artifacts, evidences of behavior patterns, value structures, creative expression are all assimilated into conformation with an outline which may be used to describe any human culture. Accepting basic techniques and judgments developed by anthropologists, the advocates of the culture concept have added some complex and potentially rewarding conditions of their own. Whereas the anthropologist has been accustomed to dealing with remote civilizations whose static elements are most apparent, the problem has now become one of dealing with recent social patterns in the United States where change and growth are the outstanding conditions. Furthermore, when one goes beyond the usual fields of the sociologist (demography, domestic institutions, labor and leisure patterns) and attempts to assimilate the complex products of the contemporary creative imagination, the difficulties become enormous.

Courses based on this concept draw on a variety of materials—folk and popular music, home furnishings, architecture—utilizing such early attempts at cultural profiles as Alexis de Tocqueville's (examples of course materials are taken from the more frequent responses to the survey mentioned above) or more self-consciously sociological efforts such as Lester Frank Ward's. The chronological stress is likely to be contemporary, and may rely on community studies (such as the Lynd's *Middletown*), popular treatments of social science methods and findings (such as Stuart Chase's *The Proper Study of Mankind*), and interpretive works (such as David Riesman's).

The distinction between the culture concept and the other approaches is important. The culture concept assumes that the ob-

ject of its study represents an entity, an integrated set of social patterns capable of relatively complete delineation without undue stress on prior or related cultures in the historical sense. By insisting that American culture represents a totality, it avoids the hazards of the additive approach; the student of the culture concept may not complete his social picture, but he will at least have an awareness of the manner in which his partial picture may be expected to fit into the whole. By focusing directly on American culture as such, the student sees his society as more than a simple elaboration of European culture. More important, this approach represents the most careful effort to develop a uniform method for organizing the diverse and complex materials of a civilization such as ours. If there is an American civilization, it may follow that there must be an orderly and accepted method for working towards its description. If, again, an organized methodology holds the secret of success in realizing the character of our society, then the culture concept may provide the best hope.

At the moment, however, this hope may be a long way off. In developing their techniques, exponents of the culture concept have deviated from the practices and theories of the very social sciences from which they borrowed. Humanists have resented the implications of their often quantitative standards, their emphasis on the describable norm rather than the provocative exception, their tendency to treat all products of the imagination equally regardless of the aesthetic merits to which scholarly lifetimes in other fields are often devoted. With their methods undetermined and their conclusions as yet unproven, the advocates of the culture concept have run the hazards that all men do who claim to be working out "THE answer." For most interested academicians, the answer must still rest on the combined contributions of the humanities and social sciences rather than on a single inclusive solution.

A great many approaches to American civilization in the classroom, other than the culture concept, are represented in our colleges. Their variety is bewildering, although their purpose (to produce an ordered description of American civilization from the diverse materials of that civilization) remains constant. These

courses subscribe to no universal rationale. They arrange themselves humanistically rather than scientifically. Separately, and as a group, they reveal a great deal concerning the academic approach to American society.

The range of materials covered in these courses is broad indeed, including much of the history of ideas, institutions, literature and the fine arts as applied to the United States. Both primary and interpretive works are brought into consideration. In the first category frequent use is made of the writings of such figures as Emerson, Thoreau, Henry Adams, William James, and C. S. Pierce—men whose broad considerations of their society invite generalizations. Rarely, though, are such materials treated in their full breadth; rather, such works as these are considered in combination with others so as to provide for a treatment of the society which revolves around the development of a cultural theme or themes. Such interpretive works as Commager's *The American Mind*, Gabriel's *The Course of American Democratic Thought*, Parrington's *Main Currents in American Thought* are frequently utilized to suggest one or more of these themes. Themes are varied: individualism, the reform spirit, radicalism, the religious impulse, liberalism, the influence of science or business. The effect of this approach, regardless of the choice of theme, is to say that American civilization is incapable of total comprehension within the limits of a specific course. Further, it is implied, the best way to approach an understanding involves an abandonment of the usual chronological and categorical commitments, and necessitates a dedication to the accumulation of evidence—from whatever source and in whatever order—which will promote the full elaboration of a particular facet of the national experience. Conventional courses supply the student with experience in organizing by type or by strict periodization. The course which takes as its special objective the understanding of the society in broader terms must build on this background, but must also abandon traditional methods in order to slash across a wealth of possible sources and produce such unified understanding of at least some prominent trait in our collective character.

If the thematic treatment of American civilization can be taken

as the common method for dealing with this subject, some clues may be found in the way this general approach is developed which will lead to a realization of what the academician finds in his civilization. In examining the materials presented in such courses, one is struck by the frequent mention of Jefferson, Hamilton, Jackson, Calhoun, Melville, Hawthorne, Whitman, Bellamy, and George, and by the absence of such names as Washington, Monroe, Irving, Longfellow, and Holmes. Figures are obviously chosen for the sake of controversy. The established, uncontroversial reputations are more or less neglected, and the emphasis is clearly placed on conflict. Themes themselves are frequently chosen in pairs and presented frankly in the form of debates: urbanism *v.* agrarianism, the North *v.* the South, the '20s *v.* the '30s, *Babbitt v. Middletown*. There is even a consistency of this sort noticeable in the interpretive works and source collections adopted: Daniel Aaron's *America in Crisis*, Potter, Manning, and Davies' *Nationalism and Sectionalism in America*, Thorp, Curti, and Baker's *American Issues*. The most often mentioned of all of these collections, the *Problems in American Civilization* series, opens each of its pamphlets with a stated "clash of issues" and deliberately makes of its selections a dramatically two-sided case on such issues as the re-chartering of the Second Bank of the United States or the causes of the Civil War.

In many ways and by many devices, then, the study of American civilization in the college classroom has been made into a consideration of contending forces and ideas. At first glance this willingness to leave the student with a picture of American society resting painfully on the horns of a perhaps irresolvable conflict may appear to be another way of simply avoiding the task of coming directly and finally to terms with the problem at hand. A second glance may reveal more of wisdom and less of cowardice.

No culture in the history of man has been without its own particular contradictions in terms of custom and conviction. One might search hard, however, to bring to light a society based on so many and such persistent sets of fundamental paradoxes. We have the most highly developed system of universal education ever heard of, yet our media of mass entertainment focus on an audi-

ence of distressingly low tastes and intelligence; we operate our high-consumption economy with more-than-occasional rumblings of our Puritan conscience and our convictions in favor of the simple life. We honor creative achievement only slightly in our status-ladder, yet we are inordinately proud when American authors and performers gain international recognition. Preaching doctrines of classlessness, good sportsmanship, conformity, and majority rule, we are none the less plagued by a ruthless success-drive and a feeling that our society, above all, is based on the capabilities, even eccentricities, of the free individual.

The list of these basic and disturbing paradoxes could be continued. Recalling and recognizing them may provide the necessary basis for appreciating the academic contribution to the study of our way of life. If classroom study has provided no pat answer to the riddle of American civilization, it has at least shown the academician pursuing a basic method for describing this society. Meanwhile, the spotlight has been placed on a rich consideration of the many conflicting themes which express the underlying assumptions of American civilization.



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
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